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ABSTRACT 
Genetically Modified Organisms (GMOs) have a polarizing effect in the US. The first 
commercially viable GMO was Roundup Ready Soy, introduced by Monsanto in 1996, to be used 
in conjunction with Roundup herbicides. This thesis investigated and delineated the development 
and deployments of the discourse of Monsanto’s agricultural assemblage of Roundup Ready 
seeds and Roundup herbicides and its resistant discourses. Monsanto builds its discourse around 
the safety and necessity of Roundup Ready seeds through federal regulation and toxicology 
studies. Resistant discourses deployed by Monsanto’s critics problematize Roundup safety and 
reject Monsanto’s contention that GMOs are necessary for meeting world’s food demands. The 
discourse analysis pursued in this thesis explored interactions between the dominant discourse 
and counter discourses and charted their deployments in Colorado’s and Oregon’s 2014 ballot 
measures that would have required mandatory GMO labeling. Analysis suggested counter 
discourses were successful in mobilizing people to engage civically.  
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INTRODUCTION TO THE DISCOURSES 
“At Monsanto, we believe agriculture should be improved for the same basic reasons that 
medicine, engineering, architecture and computers should be improved: because human innovation is at 
the center of human progress” (“Improving Agriculture,” n.d.). 
Roundup is a glyphosate-based herbicide made by Monsanto that was licensed in the US in 
1974. Since then, it is said that is the most studied herbicide in the world. Roundup has enjoyed world-
wide ubiquity, and in 1993, Roundup Ready seeds (GMOs) were licensed to be used in conjunction with 
the herbicide. Stories and articles surrounding the topic of GMOs are common, as illustrated by this 
headline: “Monsanto, Under Attack for GMOs, Has a New Defender” (Bunge, 2014) or “Can These GMO 
Foods Save the World?” (Myers, 2014) Monsanto and its agricultural technologies are highly visible in the 
debate about GMOs, so much so that often the counter discourses focus specifically on the company and 
its agricultural assemblage between Roundup and Roundup Ready seeds.  
Monsanto’s Roundup and Roundup Ready seeds enjoy ubiquity in the US. However, there is 
controversy about the necessity or safety of the technology.  Competing risk frameworks concerning the 
safety of the Round-up assemblage of agricultural practices are constituted in competing discourses 
produced by Monsanto and its critics: there is a dominant discourse deployed by Monsanto and 
counter discourses developed by those opposed to their technology. Discourses critical of Monsanto 
and its products circulate widely across scientific journals and popular media painting a picture of 
polarized public opinion around GM—one is either for, or against, GM technology. GMOs represent a 
flashpoint where much of the public debate focuses on Monsanto’s Roundup Ready seeds and 
agricultural assemblages—especially the use of Roundup. This thesis will not be directly investigating the 
safety of Roundup or the GMOs that are in use, but rather will analyze Monsanto’s discourse pertaining to 
Roundup Ready seeds and Roundup, and the steadiness of its deployment in a context of growing 




RQ1: What are the dominant and counter discourses surrounding Monsanto’s Roundup and 
Roundup Ready Seeds? 
RQ2: How are these discourses deployed in regulatory policy and political activism around 
labeling? 
These research questions are addressed by identifying and analyzing the discourse of genetically 
modified Roundup ready seeds produced primarily by the agricultural giant Monsanto, but also deployed 
by government agencies, such as the US FDA, USDA, EPA, and other authorities, such as the 
academics who are involved in the Genetic Literacy project. This thesis will also identify popular counter 
discourses that oppose Monsanto’s formulations, as well as identify alternative discourses, especially 
alternative accounts of safety produced in scientific discourse about Round-Up safety. 
Discourse analysis requires a historical context and framing, the next section will develop 
discourse analysis more fully. The following section will describe my methodology for gathering 
representative texts and analysis. Chapter One functions to introduce background information on 
Roundup and Roundup Ready seeds briefly and outline the method of analysis. Chapter Two will be an 
in-depth development of Monsanto’s dominant discourse and deployment; Chapter Three will develop 
both counter discourses to the dominant discourse as well as alternative discourses and deployment of 
these discourses; and lastly Chapter Four will question the efficacy of counter discourses and alternative 
discourses.  
Background Information 
 On March 28, 2013, President Obama signed HR-933 into law. HR-933 represents the 
Congressional budget bill for 2013, if it had not been approved and signed into law the US Government 
would have shut down. In HR-933, section 735 is known as the Farmer Assurance Provision, which is 
colloquially called “The Monsanto Protection Act.” Section 735, penned by Senator Roy Blunt (R-Mo.) and 
Monsanto, allows for the USDA approval of GM crops despite any decision by a judiciary committee that 
GM crops are unsafe (Louv, 2013). Monsanto defended section 735 suggesting Section 735 is to prevent 
planting disruption to the farmer while a crop is being tested for safety, House Committee of 
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Appropriations chairman Harold Rogers wrote that section 735 is to protect farmers from “activist groups” 
(Rogers as quoted by Louv, 2013) disrupting the distribution of GM crops during litigation with the USDA.  
 The American multinational company, Monsanto, was founded in 1901 by Francis Queeny. 
Monsanto was primarily a chemical company, having amassed its fortune with PCBs (Robin, 2010). 
PCBs, Polychlorinated biphenyls, were used in electrics and machinery as a coolant. Marie-Monique 
Robin (2010) chronicles Monsanto’s PCB marketing, research, and distribution. The chemical has been 
banned in the US as of 1979 because of how toxic and persistent it is in the environment, but prior to that, 
many examples can be found of PCB affecting the communities around the plants manufacturing the 
chemical. Robin (2010) argues that Monsanto knew as early as 1937 that PCBs were highly toxic, and yet 
continued to carry on production and not warn anyone. Anniston, Alabama is a prime example of a 
community affected by Monsanto and PCBS. In 2006, the Community of Anniston, brought forth a class 
action lawsuit against Monsanto. Monsanto had knowingly been polluting the community with PCB waste 
in several ways: runoff in the river, air pollution, and dumping waste in a pit near the plant. The people of 
Anniston have record numbers of cancer because of the exposure to tens of millions of tons of PCB 
waste being released. Robin (2010) refers to Monsanto’s conduct as criminal, knowingly since 1937 
polluting communities with PCB waste until the chemical was banned in 1979.  
 Critics of Monsanto such as Marie-Monique Robin (2010) and Jason Louv (2013) charge that 
Monsanto has produced many products with dubious, and sometimes devastating, effects: PCBs 
(outlined above), DDT, dioxin, Agent Orange, rBST (recombinant bovine somatotropin, a hormone that 
makes cattle lactate without being pregnant first) (Louv, 2013; Robin, 2010). Monsanto does not directly 
address these charges, in fact as of this writing, on the “Who We Are” page of Monsanto’s website, these 
events are not discussed and instead the company focuses on its current endeavors: 
Monsanto is a sustainable agriculture company. We deliver agricultural products that support 
farmers all around the world. We are focused on empowering farmers—large and small—to 
produce more from their land while conserving more of our world's natural resources such as 
water and energy. We do this with our leading seed brands in crops like corn, cotton, oilseeds 
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and fruits and vegetables. We also produce leading in-the-seed trait technologies for farmers, 
which are aimed at protecting their yield, supporting their on-farm efficiency and reducing their 
on-farm costs. 
We strive to make our products available to farmers throughout the world by broadly 
licensing our seed and trait technologies to other companies. In addition to our seeds and traits 
business, we also manufacture Roundup® and other herbicides used by farmers, consumers and 
lawn-and-garden professionals. 
Monsanto could not exist without farmers. They are our customers--the lifeblood of our 
company. More important, they are the support system of the world's economy, working day in 
and day out to feed, clothe and provide energy for our world. (“Who We Are,” n.d.) 
The history outlined here represents a contested history of Monsanto and its products forwarded by its 
many critics and, as such, it is important to the development of counter discourses.  
As the “Who We Are” (n.d.) page suggests, Monsanto’s current feature product is Roundup, the 
glyphosate based herbicide. Roundup is touted as the safest herbicide on the market, glyphosate (the 
active product or AP in Roundup) does not persist in the environment and breaks down into an inert salt 
in the soil (“History of Monsanto’s Glyphosate Herbicides,” 2005). Roundup is one of the most commonly 
used herbicide in the US (second only to 2,4-D, the AP in Agent Orange). The EPA estimates 5-8 million 
pounds of Roundup are being used annually as of 2007 in homes and gardens ("2006-2007 Pesticide 
Market Estimates: Usage (Page 3) | Pesticides | US EPA,” 2013). Glyphosate was discovered by John 
Franz in 1970 while working for Monsanto. Roundup was licensed and commercialized shortly thereafter 
as a weed killer, and since then its use has expanded exponentially (Robin, 2010).  
All pesticides have an active ingredient that must be licensed by the EPA; in Roundup’s case, 
Glyphosate In addition to the active ingredient, many other inert ingredients are used to intensify the 
chemical and biological effect of the pesticide such as solvents, carriers, emulsifiers, and surfactants. 
Generally speaking, because these additional ingredients are not pesticides themselves, the constitution 
of each iteration of Roundup is different depending on the application (Robin, 2010). The concoction for 
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each Roundup formulation is beyond the purview of the EPA and often kept secret (Mesnage, Defarge, 
Spiroux de Vendomois, & Séralini, 2014; Robin, 2010). Mesnage et al. (2014) charges that “the regulatory 
system assumes that the [active product] designed to specifically target plants, insects, or fungi is the 
most toxic compound of a formulation to nontarget species, The long term regulatory tests are performed 
on this substance alone” (p. 1). Additionally, Robin (2010) writes that the EPA relies on toxicology results 
provided by agro-chemical companies, in our case Monsanto, and does not run their own toxicology 
experiments nor does the EPA overview the experimental procedures. The way herbicides in the US are 
licensed will be particularly telling in the deployment of the dominant discourse provided by Monsanto.  
Critics, such as Mesnage et al. (2014), suggest that Monsanto promotes reviews that favor their 
products, cherry-picking toxicology reports to submit to the EPA. “It is commonly believed that Roundup is 
among the safest pesticides. This idea is spread by manufacturers, mostly in the reviews they promote, 
which are often cited in toxicological evaluations of glyphosate-based herbicides” (Mesnage et al., 2014, 
p. 7). The Mesnage et al. (2014) study found Roundup to be up to 125 times more toxic than glyphosate, 
which is particularly interesting to this thesis as it stands in direct contention with Monsanto’s and the 
EPA’s claims of safety. Mesnage and colleagues’ (2014) articles, and many others represent a counter 
discourse of Roundup safety posed against the Monsanto discourse.  
Counter discourses of safety have been and continue to be contested by Monsanto. For example, 
one of the authors of the Mesnage et al. (2014) article, Gilles-Eric Séralini has faced considerable turmoil 
at the hands of the regulatory science community, including Monsanto directly. Séralini, a French 
molecular biologist and toxicologist at the University of Caen, studies genetically modified foods and has 
repeatedly found markers that contraindicate Roundup and Roundup Ready crops as safe. In September 
of 2012, Séralini published findings of a Roundup Ready crop NK603 corn study, he found the 
experimental groups of rats who were fed both Roundup treated and untreated NK603 over two years to 
have higher incidents of cancer and cases of abnormal organ (liver and kidney) tissues as well. Before 
the findings were published, Monsanto threatened the journal Food and Chemical Toxicology with legal 
action as the findings could be detrimental to their business. The article was published, which sparked 
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controversy and criticism in the scientific community, and was subsequently retracted (Fugh-Berman & 
Sherman, 2014; Smith, 2013). The Séralini affair is one germane event necessary to understand how the 
discourse developed by Monsanto interacts with those that publicly reject it.  
More challenges to the dominant Monsanto safety discourse come from alternative news sources 
such as Grist (Upton, 2014) and even mainstream media sources like NPR citing evidence of harm 
produced by alternative discourses. For example, John Upton (2014) of Grist discusses a mysterious form 
of kidney failure is crippling entire communities of sugar-farm laborers in Central America and US Centers 
for Disease Control epidemiologists have connected it to Roundup. The article claims that the disease is 
killing young men, men as young as 20, and occurs only along the Pacific coast, from southern Mexico to 
Panama. Similar chronic kidney disease has shown up in rice laborers in Sri Lanka, all connected to 
Roundup. Certainly, there has been no definitive causal link between kidney failure and Roundup 
exposure, but there is a strong correlation (Upton, 2014).  
In addition to popular media and news sources, several scientific studies have declared a link 
between Roundup exposure and Non-Hodgkin’s Lymphoma in men (De Roos, Zahm, Cantor, 
Weisenburger, Holmes, Burmeister, & Blair, 2003: Hardell & Eriksson, 1999; Hardell, Eriksson, & 
Nordstrom, 2002; McDuffie, Pahwa, McLaughlin, Spinelli, Fincham, Dosman, Robson, Skinnider, & Choi, 
2002). The link of Non-Hodgkin’s Lymphoma and Roundup is one that is directly addressed by Monsanto 
in a press release titled “Glyphosate: Response to non-Hodgkin’s Lymphoma Allegations” (2002). 
Monsanto’s press release criticizes the 1999 Hardell & Eriksson study as not meeting criteria as valid 
epidemiological science, charges it fails to make a causal link, and reminds readers of Roundup’s 
approval by the European Commission (“Glyphosate: Response to non-Hodgkin’s Lymphoma 
Allegations,” 2002). Time and time again, Monsanto claims, regulatory bodies have found Roundup and 
glyphosate to be perfectly safe (“History of Monsanto’s Glyphosate Herbicides,” 2005).  
Roundup’s patent expired in 2000, allowing for many copy-cat formulations marketed at bargain 
prices in order to compete for Monsanto’s market share. Monsanto introduced Roundup Ready crops 
shortly thereafter to maintain their hold in the marketplace. Roundup Ready soy was the first crop 
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developed by Monsanto in 1996, and today there is Roundup Ready “alfalfa, corn, cotton, spring canola, 
sugar beets and winter canola, which contain in-plant tolerance to Roundup® agricultural herbicides. This 
means one can spray Roundup agricultural herbicides in-crop from emergence through flowering for 
unsurpassed weed control, proven crop safety and maximum yield potential” (“Roundup Ready System,” 
n.d.). 
 Monsanto makes many appeals for the desirability of its products by suggesting, and in some 
cases requiring (Robin, 2010), Roundup and Roundup Ready crop be used synergistically to reduce 
costs for farmers by lessening fuel costs, land tillage, and overall herbicides used: “Herbicides are key 
products used in conservation tillage (or no-till) farming, which leaves the soil undisturbed between 
cropping seasons – therefore being a major force in reducing soil lost to wind and water erosion” 
("Monsanto | The History of Roundup,” n.d.). Echoing the Monsanto story, mainstream media cites 
authoritative voices; for example, according to a recent Forbes article citing a 20 year data review, 
research suggests there is no significant difference between livestock fed conventional food crops and 
Roundup Ready crops (Entine, 2014a). The data represented nearly 100 billion animals, fed conventional 
grain prior to 1996 (when Roundup Ready crops were approved) and then upwards of 90 percent 
Roundup Ready grain through the current year of the research (Entine, 2014a). According to Forbes, 
these researchers concluded that there is no significant difference between conventional crops and 
Roundup Ready crops; GM crops are safe (Entine, 2014a). In fact, the FDA requires no labeling of GM 
foods because they are “substantially equivalent” to their conventional counterparts (Bereano, 2014; 
O’Neil, 2014). According to O’Neil (2014), this means that unless there is material difference—differences 
that can be detected via taste, smell, or other human sense—the FDA sees no need to label.  
Despite assertions of the safety of GMOs by Monsanto and regulatory bodies, Americans remain 
uncertain. According to polls, nearly 90 percent of Americans would like to know if they are in fact eating 
GMOs. Just like Americans would like to know their tuna is dolphin safe, their shoes are American Made, 
or their chicken is Kosher. The FDA suggests labeling of GMOs as unnecessary because there is 
substantial equivalence and people do not need to know the production inputs in their food; but that 
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suggests that all the aforementioned labels are frivolous and unnecessary (O’Neil, 2014). Colin O’Neil 
(2014) writes of the decision by the FDA “it was a political, not scientific, decision to apply nineteenth-
century logic to a twentieth-century food technology, and in the process left all consumers in the dark to 
hidden changes to their food” (p. 71). Monsanto and the FDA maintain the safety and equivalence of 
Roundup Ready crops for food despite detractors (Entine, 2014a). 
 Critics also remain unconvinced by these assertions and challenge the safety of GMO products, 
some critics are suggesting links to neurological effects. Stephanie Seneff, a research scientist at the MIT 
Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence Laboratory, links Roundup Ready crops and a myriad of 
different ailments. Seneff says of Roundup and Monsanto: “since Monsanto first introduced Roundup into 
crops in 1974, there’s been a rise in autism and other diseases […] I’m certain at this point that 
glyphosate is the most important factor in an alarming number of epidemic diseases” (Jackson, 2014). 
Her research links the use of glyphosate to diseases like Alzheimer’s, diabetes, pancreatic cancer, thyroid 
cancer, Non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma, and Parkinson’s disease. Seneff’s research also may have 
implications linking the herbicide to the ongoing brood failure in bee colonies (Jackson, 2014).  
 There seems to be a polarization within the scientific community regarding Roundup and 
Roundup Ready crops; begging the question of why is there so much difference in how data sets are 
interpreted? Dr. Don Huber, professor emeritus at Purdue University, suggests that “some of our 
scientists are the ones who are the most difficult—and the biggest impediment to better research—
because their funding is dependent on the very same agrichemical companies like Monsanto that are 
producing Roundup. They’re not about to go in a different direction from the people who’ve been funding 
them” (Jackson, 2014). Dr. Don Huber’s stated concerns point to the importance of understanding how 
Monsanto’s discourse was developed and deployed, appropriated and resisted, in agriculture, 
government, science, media and social activism. 
  Methodology 
 To answer the research questions proposed in the previous section a discourse analysis was 
performed by delineating discourses into the dominant discourse of Roundup and Roundup Ready seeds 
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deployed by Monsanto and the counter discourse deployed by critics of the herbicide and its synergistic 
seed system. More specific methods are outlined below. 
Dominant Discourse 
First, this thesis will investigate the dominant Monsanto discourse of GM safety while focusing on 
how safety is articulated and framed. To identify the dominant discourse a convenience and relevant 
sampling of the Roundup technology deployment through texts such as advertisements will be utilized, 
television advertising texts will be utilized. The toxicology report cited by Monsanto’s website to declare 
the safety of the herbicide and seeds will also be examined. Other communications deployed by 
Monsanto on services such as their Facebook company page and company Twitter account will inform 
the discourse analysis as well. Press releases from federal agencies such as the USDA, FDA, and EPA 
will be utilized, as well. Mainstream news sources (e.g., Wall Street Journal, New York Times) and 
alternative news sources (e.g., Mother Jones, Alternet) will also be part the discovery, limited to the 
articles published within the last 18 months, with a focus on deployments of dominant discourse and 
oppositional discourses. Additionally, as other texts become part of the discovery that supports the 
dominant discourse they will also become part of the analysis. The aim in doing so is to identify common 
themes among the dominant discourses. 
Counter Discourse 
 This thesis will identify the common rejected and contested issues of the dominant discourses to 
develop an understanding of the counter discourse by investigating a range of authoritative voices, from 
citizen activists to scientific authorities, exploring how their discourses are articulated, deployed and 
disseminated. To identify counter discourses, this thesis will be examining the studies that challenge both 
Monsanto’s assertions of safety and the various toxicology reports that counter the one Monsanto cites 
for those assertions of safety. The counter discourse analysis will also examine alternative news sources 
(e.g., Mother Jones, Alternet) to understand and identify resistant authorities and discourses, as well as 
mainstream news sources (e.g., Wall Street Journal, New York Times.), activist groups such as Food 
Democracy Now and Organic Consumers Organization and activities like “March against Monsanto” 
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literature and events will also become part of the discovery. As with the dominant discourse, this thesis 
was open to other texts that support the counter discourses that may arise upon discovery. 
 A discourse analysis will be performed, or rather a genealogy of the dominant and counter 
discourses. Discourse analysis is a tool to uncover social constructions situated in both social and 
scientific areas. The investigation of Monsanto’s dominant discourse, competing discourse, and 
alternative discourses require a historical contextualization and framing within society and science. 
Discourse analysis also includes analysis of outcomes of competing discourses.  How each discourse 
represents its own contextualized history within the story Roundup Ready seeds and Roundup will be 
identified. This thesis will also identify the selective frames in which both the dominant discourse and 
counter discourse constitute problems and also the selective framing of solutions to those problems, for 
example Monsanto describes GM technologies as a solution to food scarcity and those discourses that 
counter the Monsanto discourse may see GM technology as the problem itself with abstinence as the 
solution. This thesis will be asking how authoritative voices are developed. It will be especially interested 
in how dominant and counter discourses are deployed, but even more so interesting is what will be 
revealed by what is missing in each discourse. Finally, this thesis will be looking at outcomes of each 
discourse and how each discourse defines success and efficacy. 
Organization of Thesis 
Chapter One introduced the background information needed to explore the dominant and 
counter discourses more fully in Chapters Two and Three. Chapter One has also outlined discourse 
analysis methods necessary to reconstruct the dominant and counter discourses in the US.  
Chapter Two houses the analysis of the development and deployments of the dominant 
discourse of Roundup and its everyday normalization in weed-control, as well as Roundup Ready seeds 
in agriculture and the historical contextualization of GMOs. This chapter will also describe examples from 
the texts to fully develop the common concepts within each form of deployment (e.g., Monsanto’s 
website, advertisements, press releases from federal agencies).  
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Chapter Three is a development of the supra counter discourse composed from scientific and 
populist counter discourses. This chapter will be focusing on the texts that question the dominant 
discourse employed by Monsanto and the Federal Government. Generally, these texts call into question 
the safety of the agricultural assemblage Roundup and Roundup Ready seeds, but there is more to their 
formulations than safety. As a collective, the counter discourses resist the dominant framing of 
Monsanto’s agricultural assemblage to constitute a larger supra counter discourse. Chapter Three will 
also examine some the alternative visions of agricultural production available within the discourse, such 
as Polyface Farms in Virginia. Polyface is a closed-ended eco-system where there is very little input from 
outside the farm, such as corn, hay, and chicken feed. It is important to include alternative discourses 
because the modern food system, as we know it, is only 50 or so years old (Pollan, 2007). 
Chapter Four is an analysis of social change through counter discourses. It will ask the question: 
have counter discourses been successful in calling into question the dominant discourse as well as 
mobilizing institutional change regarding Roundup? To answer this, Chapter four will be discussing 
mobilizations of people in the 2014 ballot initiatives to label GMO foods in Colorado and Oregon. It will be 







Silent Spring by Rachel Carson is so frequently credited with galvanizing the Environmental 
movement in the U.S. that it is emblazoned on the front cover, “The Classic that Launched the 
Environmental Movement.” The introduction by Linda Lear (2002) is a poignant chronicling of the climate 
that greeted the book, “Carson’s thesis that we were subjecting ourselves to slow poisoning by the 
misuse of chemical pesticides that polluted the environment may seem like common currency now, but in 
1962 Silent Spring contained the kernel of social revolution” (Lear, 2002, p. x). The chemical industry was 
in a post-WWII boon with pesticides in common use like DDT and many others. Carson challenged the 
vision of the companies so much so that she was repeatedly attacked as unscientific and an outsider 
(Fosberg, 1963), but her outsider status actually worked in her favor to see and explain how the toxic 
chemicals were harming us (Lear, 2002). Preeminent botanist F.R. Fosberg (1963) wrote a review of the 
book in the journal Ecology asserting that a review from the industry was necessary as there were threats 
of injunction of continued publication by the chemical industry. Regardless of the outcry, Rachel Carson’s 
book had gone on to become a bestseller, and no attempt to discredit the author or the expose has been 
capable of stopping its sales. Silent Spring was frequently attacked as a faux-science report by the 
chemical industry instead of what it was—an account of one woman’s interpretation of the state of the 
environment. Fosberg (1963) writes of the book, 
it is no more scientific than are the advertising of the pesticide salesmen, the mass application 
pest-control programs of the U.S. Department of Agriculture, and the propaganda to justify them. 
This book is strictly an effort to present the other side of this whole matter to those who are 
paying for, and whose health and enjoyment are being affected by, current procedures of pest 
control. (Fosberg, 1963)  
He goes on to say the Carson simply took factual evidence available in the scientific literature and 
made it available and understandable by the general public (Fosberg, 1963). Fosberg’s (1963) 
assessment of Silent Spring is one that Linda Lear (2002), among others will agree with, but the chemical 
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industry, including Monsanto disagreed with vehemently. Monsanto even published a parody called The 
Desolate Year to combat Carson’s account of the situation (Stauber & Rampton, 1995). The idea that 
Carson’s writings gave rise to the modern environmental movement is not hyperbole, Rampton and 
Stauber, authors of Toxic Sludge is Good for You (1995) describe the book as interrupting “business as 
usual” for many Americans and even launched the first Earth Day on April 22, 1970. Silent Spring (1962) 
set the tone for the next 20 years of legislation in the U.S. as it made the public more aware of the fallout 
incurred by uses of DDT and other herbicides like 2,4-D (which is still in use today) and 2,4,5-T (Stauber 
& Rampton, 1995). Many argue that Silent Spring (1962) is the reason the public demanded regulation of 
harmful chemicals. In the face of DDT potentially being banned, agriculture needed acceptable and safe 
herbicides, safe herbicides like Monsanto’s Roundup.  
This chapter begins by understanding a popular press book, Silent Spring, and its effect on the 
discourse of toxic environments and pesticides. Silent Spring pre-empts a host of legislative measures 
such as the Toxic Substance Control Act and The Delaney Clause, which will be discussed in depth in the 
following section. This chapter will explore changes in accepted toxicology paradigms to understand the 
dismantling and re-articulation of legislation designed to protect the American public from hazards. 
Monsanto’s star product, Roundup and its synergistic seed systems, emerged in this climate and found 
acceptance. Roundup’s continued success is situated in the dominant discourse as safe and necessary, 
Roundup Ready crops are by extension of Roundup’s discourse as safe and necessary. In addition to 
looking into the changes in the legislation and scientific thought, this chapter explores the dominant 
discourse of Monsanto’s assemblage of Roundup, and Roundup Ready crops. 
Historical Contextualization 
Shortly before the 1940s were in full swing, the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938 was 
passed by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA). The more consumer-oriented Food, Drug and 
Cosmetic Act was a reaction to consumer pressures largely put forth by women’s groups, the act was an 
effort “designed to protect the pocketbooks of consumers” (“About FDA | The Food, Drug, and Cosmetic 
Act of 1938,” 2009) by creating food standards. “The law provided for three kinds of food standards: 1) 
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standards (definitions) of identity, 2) standards of quality, and 3) standards regulating the fill of container. 
Regulators had the discretionary authority to set standards ‘whenever in the judgment of the Secretary 
such action will promote honesty and fair dealing in the interests of consumers’” (“About FDA | The Food, 
Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938,” 2009). The Delaney amendment in 1958 updated section 401 of the 
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic act to include proscribing any food additives that have shown carcinogenic 
effects in laboratory animals. The Delaney Clause represented, and still does represent, the most risk 
averse piece of U.S. legislation to date.  
The clause was proposed by Congressman James Delaney, “the chair of a special committee 
formed to investigate the pesticide contamination of food” (D. Vogel, 2012, p. 45). The public and 
legislative bodies were increasingly uncertain about rising cancer rates with unknown causes and the 
wide use of the chemical pesticide DDT, and the clause was passed swiftly. The clause states that “no 
additive shall be deemed to be safe if it is found to induce cancer when ingested by man or animal, or if it 
is found, after tests which are appropriate for the evaluation of food additives to induce cancer in man or 
animals” (Smart, 1998 as quoted by D. Vogel, 2012, p. 45). Essentially, the clause created a zero 
tolerance policy toward suspected carcinogenic additives and raised public salience of the issue of 
potentially hazardous food additives. 
A few years later, carcinogens were singled out again with the passing of the Toxic Substance 
Control Act (TSCA) in 1976; in fact, during the 1970s in the U.S. more than twenty-one risk averse laws 
were adopted apropos of carcinogens (D. Vogel, 2012).  The law allowed the EPA to regulate industry by 
requiring companies to provide data on production, use, health effects, and other matters concerning 
chemical substances (Harmison, 1978). The TSCA resulted from urging by the Council on Environmental 
Quality of Congress to close the regulatory gap that allowed for “hundreds of new chemicals to be 
marketed each year without adequate testing and provided no way for the federal government to test the 
safety of chemicals already in use” (D. Vogel, 2012, p. 155). Pesticides were regulated prior to the new 
TSCA and are not subject to the TSCA regulations (Harmison, 1978). In 1972, the U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) was given authority by the 1972 Federal Environmental Pesticide Control Act to 
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suspend use and distribution of pesticides based on a potential injury basis versus a demonstrable injury 
basis (D. Vogel, 2012). Demonstrable injury was based on risk assessments and toxicology profiles 
provided by the manufacturers themselves (J. Vogel, 2004; S. Vogel, 2008; D. Vogel, 2012), a caveat that 
made many chemical companies concerned over cost (Rattner, 1976).  
The public was also increasingly concerned about water pollution and safe drinking water in the 
face of political debate over toxic substances. The 1972 Federal Water Pollution Act, commonly known as 
the Clean Water Act of 1972, gave the EPA authority to establish maximum thresholds of pollutants in 
drinking water and to maintain and restore the integrity of drinking water (“EPA | History of the Clean 
Water Act,” 2014). The Clean Water Act set thresholds for pesticide runoff as well.  
Monsanto’s Roundup was registered in 1974 with the EPA and available for sale in 1976 
according to Monsanto’s “Company History” page (2013); its registration and sale began in a time of 
skepticism and risk aversion to chemicals deemed toxic. People were increasingly concerned about 
pesticide exposure and its impact on the environment. As Rachel Carson’s (1962) account of harmful 
pesticides loomed over the chemical industry, Monsanto’s newest herbicide Roundup gained ground as 
its active ingredient glyphosate was shown to be safe as it metabolizes into a form of salt after exposure 
to water and sunlight and does not pose unreasonable risks to either the environment or to humans when 
used as labeled (EPA R.E.D. Facts Glyphosate, 1993; "History of Monsanto’s Glyphosate Herbicides,” 
2005; “What is glyphosate?,” 2014). Glyphosate is a non-selective herbicide approved for use in both 
food and non-food crops in the U.S. by the EPA (EPA R.E.D. Facts Glyphosate, 1993). The herbicide 
works by inhibiting an enzyme, EPSP synthase, within the plant that it needs to grow. The plan will wither 
within 24 hours and will be yellowed within a few days and will subsequently die off. EPSP synthase is not 
a required enzyme by humans or animals and as such, the herbicide poses no risk to humans or animals 
(“What is glyphosate?,” 2014). Additionally, the herbicide binds tightly with most soils and therefore is not 
available for reuptake in neighboring plants ("History of Monsanto’s Glyphosate Herbicides,” 2005).  
According to the US Geological Survey, as of 2007, glyphosate is in use in almost all agricultural 
and urban areas in the US. Overall, agricultural use has increased from less than 11,000 tons in 1992 to 
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at least 88,000 tons in 2007 (Capel & Capelli, 2011). Monsanto’s site boasts its star’s ubiquity in that 
Roundup is one of the most used herbicides in the world, Monsanto’s glyphosate products are registered 
in 130 countries and approved for weed control in more than 100 crops. “No other herbicide active 
ingredient compares in terms of number of approved uses” (“History of Monsanto’s Glyphosate 
Herbicides,” 2005).  
Between the regulations of the TSCA and the Clean Water Act and the Delaney Clause, 
Monsanto’s new star herbicide was registered. For all intents and purposes, by all accounts of 
measurement, Roundup was safe. The environmentalists were quieted as the TSCA ushered out problem 
chemicals like DDT, Dioxin, and PCBs. Companies began open discussion with consumers on how they 
were going to be more accountable for their products and pollution, but of course, everyone had a part to 
play in cleaning up the Earth (Stauber & Rampton, 1995).  
In 1982, the Reagan Administration sought to simplify the Clean Water Act to mitigate some of 
the necessities of compliance for companies and states (Shabecoff, 1982). Journalist Philip Shabecoff’s 
article discusses the fourteen proposed amendments of the time and the reactions of environmental 
groups. Included in the updated draft of the law would be a 4-year extension for companies to implement 
the “best available technology” to treat and contain their waste. The environmental groups called the 
proposal “a cynical attempt to undermine one the country’s best environmental laws” (Shabecoff, 1982). 
Within the new proposal, the maximum term of discharge permits would increase from 5 to 10 years, 
companies would only have to update their technology to maintain waste every 10 years and more 
exemptions would be provided for Federal polluters for cleaning up toxic waste (Shabecoff, 1982). There 
were concerns of dismantling legislations like the Clean Water Act for economic reasons (Shabecoff, 
1982).  
The TSCA implementation fared no better than the Clean Water Act, critics point out that the 
TSCA exempts certain chemicals because they are either presumed safe from current use or because 
they are subject to other forms of legislation. The exempted chemicals include: “pesticides, radioactive 
materials, food and food additives, drugs and cosmetics, and firearms and munitions” (Draggan, 1978, p. 
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260), it is important to note at this point that Monsanto’s Roundup is considered an exempted chemical. 
David Vogel (2012) points out that only five previously presumed safe chemicals have been restricted 
following the TSCA’s implementation in 1976.  Additionally, the chemical industry was concerned about 
their costs of testing, suggesting it will cost upwards of two billion dollars a year, and the General 
Accounting Office estimates it will be about 100 to 200 million annually. Dow Chemical Company, a vocal 
opponent of the bill, was concerned about the EPA having too much political power and the bill had too 
little to do with toxicity testing (Free, 1976; Rattner, 1976). 
The EPA was criticized for its failure to implement the bill as written and had granted exemptions 
for 99% of all users of PCBs in America. Also, as of the writing of the 1979 article by Severo, the agency 
had failed to decide how to deal with the 40,000 chemicals already in use in industry (Severo, 1979). A 
year later, Severo (1980) pointed out another failure that in the three years post passing of the TSCA, the 
EPA had missed “almost every deadline established by the act on January 1, 1977.” EPA officials 
complained that chemical companies are not forthcoming or compliant of the law, and environmentalists 
criticized the agency’s lack of action. Also, Severo (1980) reports that PCBs were still widely in use 
despite the law because the EPA had granted hardship exemptions to 99.3% of companies that used 
PCBs. More recent as of 1996, the TSCA had over 75,000 chemicals in its inventory and only 263 
chemicals with toxicology profiles provided by the companies that manufactured said chemicals (J. Vogel, 
2004).   
Risk Conceptualization. The school of thought regarding risk and exposure was archaic at best 
(Vogel, 2004) and with limited resources, it is no wonder that the EPA officials and the Administration 
declared they were overburdened by the sheer volume of chemicals to inventory and regulate; there 
needed to be regulatory change to the TSCA (Shabecoff, 1982). S. Vogel (2008) outlines the 
conceptualization of risk under the Reagan Administration which may account for the aforementioned 
proposed changes. “Risk is relative” (S. Vogel, 2008, p. 668) is a concept Vogel uses to describe how 
policy was interpreted and refers to the idea that chemical toxicity injury is relative to the amount of 
exposure. S. Vogel (2008) aligns the concept to an equation “risk = hazard x exposure” (p. 668). This idea 
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was expanded upon with “new methods and technologies for quantifying exposure” (p. 668) also known 
as biomonitoring. The equation was then updated to risk = hazard x presence. S. Vogel (2008) suggests 
this narrative of risk “was used to legitimize the proliferation of industrial chemicals throughout the 
twentieth century” (p. 668). Safety could be achieved by minimizing the exposure to the hazard (S. Vogel, 
2008), which is the basis of the Delaney Clause of 1958, any hazard shown to be carcinogenic in animal 
trials was proscribed. Unfortunately, the Delaney Clause was undermined in 1962 by an amendment that 
allowed for the use of DES—a drug used in livestock to increase meat production—provided it was not 
detectable in the “edible flesh” (p. 669).  
The FDA attempted to use the Delaney Clause to block the use of plastics that can leach 
carcinogens into food through packaging, but Monsanto and other industry lobbyists showed quantitative 
evidence of the amount of chemicals that leached from plastic was well below detectable limits (S. Vogel, 
2008). In fact, this scientific paradigm of undetectable risk as risk mitigation found its way into many 
decisions regarding carcinogens, and eventually in 1996 the Delaney Clause was repealed and replaced 
with the Food Quality Protection Act which set a single standard for all pesticide residues in food, both 
processed and fresh (S. Vogel, 2008). 
Generally, quantitative evidence of harm will refer to toxicology trials to determine maximum dose 
exposure limits before injury results. S. Vogel (2008) suggests the guiding principle of toxicology is “the 
dose makes the poison,” where animal research experiments are utilized to find “where toxic response 
begins and ends” (p. 670), which is similar to the aforementioned risk conceptualizations. The experiment 
designs typically include extremely high doses of chemicals given to adult animals to “determine the 
lowest level at which a toxic effect occurs or preferably the level at which no toxic effect is seen” (p. 670) 
which is referred to the “lowest observed adverse effect level” or LOAEL or “no observed adverse effect 
level” or NOAEL. These levels are then extrapolated to humans with an uncertainty factor of 100 to 1000 
fold figured in to account for differences in individual responses to the chemical and the tested chemicals 
are generally considered safe at these levels. Regulatory bodies such as the FDA and EPA use the 
NOAEL or LOAEL thresholds to make assessments of risk, S. Vogel (2008) writes of the FDA: “over the 
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past fifteen years, however, studies measuring the effects of very low-dose exposures to pesticides, 
herbicides, and industrial chemicals—levels presumed to be safe—began filling in the black box of low-
dose effects” (p. 670). Monsanto’s Roundup would be included in this criticism. 
Furthermore, troubling insights from researchers regarding chemicals and herbicides were 
coming to a proverbial head in the 1990s. In 1991, an interdisciplinary conference of wildlife biologists, 
experimental endocrinologists, and molecular biologists came to a consensus regarding endocrine 
disrupters called the Wingspread Statement. The Wingspread Statement, according to Vogel (2008), 
“declare[s] with certainty that ‘a large number of man-made chemicals that have been released into the 
environment, as well as a few natural ones, have the potential to disrupt the endocrine systems of 
animals, including humans’” (p. 670). Chemicals referred to as endocrine disrupters have potentially 
adverse effects beyond cancer on the reproductive, immunological, behavioral, and neurological systems 
of animals. Endocrine disruption research challenges long held beliefs that minute exposures, NOAELS 
and LOAELS, are necessary but benign in the face of economic prosperity. Research on endocrine 
disrupters reframes the paradigm of “the dose makes the poison” to “timing makes the poison” as even 
minute exposures at critical development intervals are detrimental (S. Vogel, 2008). Industry has laid its 
best efforts to undermine endocrine research as junk science, but the topic has been persistent in political 
and scientific salience (S. Vogel, 2008), similar to the efforts against Herbert Needleman’s research on 
minute exposures to lead and long term health outcomes.  
Needleman and Timing Makes The Poison. Pediatrician and psychologist Herbert Needleman 
effectively took on the lead industry in 1979 when he and his colleagues published “Deficits in 
psychologic and classroom performance of children with elevated dentine lead levels” in The New 
England Journal of Medicine. The body mistakes lead for calcium and will deposit and store lead in 
bones, so Needleman collected deciduous teeth from teachers in low-, medium-, and high-income school 
districts to tract lead levels in children. Children were also given IQ tests and their teachers were asked to 
rate every student in their respective class on levels of attentiveness, hyperactivity, asocial tendencies, 
and several other “non-adaptive” behavior measures. Needleman (1979) concluded “frequency of non-
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adaptive classroom behavior increased in a dose-related fashion to dentine lead level. Lead exposure, at 
doses below those producing symptoms severe enough to be diagnosed clinically, appears to be 
associated with neuropsychologic deficits that may interfere with classroom performance” (p. 689).  
Needleman hypothesized that no level of lead exposure was safe, a concept revolutionary in 
environmental toxicology at the time. According to a 2005 interview with Needleman, the lead industry 
was silent for about 6 months before beginning an assault on him, his data, and his conclusions (Rosner 
& Markowitz, 2005).  
Needleman had made enemies within an industry that feared the implications of his research; in 
the 13 years following the 1979 publication became an inquiry of scientific research fraud, misconduct, 
falsification, and plagiarism through the university he worked for and the EPA essentially accused him of 
junk science. The U.S. Office of Research Integrity exonerated the doctor in 1992 (Markel, 2013; Rosner 
& Markowitz, 2005). The timeline of exoneration coincides with S. Vogel’s (2008) suggestion that timing of 
low-dose hazard makes the poison scientific paradigm found its footing, but perhaps Needleman’s work 
gave the foundation for its salience.  
Needleman’s work suggests that even at minimal exposure to hazards there are potentially 
insidious and subtle low-dose effects of presumed safe chemicals. Lead had been in use by humans for 
an extended time (Markel, 2013), presumably safe if one does not develop plumbism—acute lead 
poisoning. S. Vogel (2008) outlines the paradigm shift from “dose makes the poison” to “timing makes the 
poison,” while Needleman’s work embodies the shift. Yet another researcher (Vogel, 2004) suggests that 
the scientific paradigm to define risk is fraudulent in its conception.  
Toxicology Paradigm Shifts. According to Jason Vogel (2004), science’s role in chemical 
regulation is problematic because of several assumptions in the testing paradigm: “(1) scientific 
determination of harm must precede regulatory action, (2) science has the capacity to determine harm 
with sufficient certainty, and (3) chemical exposure affects humans according to the assumptions of 
classic toxicology” (p. 297). The first assumption forces regulation into “getting the science right” (p. 297), 
effectively changing the end-goal to be using science and distracting from protecting public health. J.  
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Vogel (2004) goes on to suggest that scientific determination also serves to exclude “non-testing 
regulatory alternatives [such as] subsidies for organic farming” (p. 297). Secondly, the idea that 
statistically significant certainty of cause and effect can be determined in endocrine disruption is doomed 
to fail because the science simply is not there yet. Finally, the assumption that exposure to endocrine 
disrupters can be proven beyond a doubt within exposure to other synergistic and environmental effects 
makes certain that legal and scientific proof will never be ascertained (J. Vogel, 2004). 
In 1996 the Food Quality Protection Act effectively took the place of the Delaney Clause, came 
with a mandate to investigate the effects of synthetic chemicals on the human endocrine system. The 
EPA implemented the Endocrine Disrupter Screening Program (EDSP), which allows the EPA 
administrator to take action to protect public and determine if a chemical is an endocrine disrupter using 
“appropriate validated test systems and other scientifically relevant information” (J. Vogel, 2004, p. 283). 
Jason Vogel (2004) is cynical of the EDSP, he asserts that the scientific vigor of the EDSP favors 
industry, presuming a synthetic chemical is innocent until proven an endocrine disrupter and as such is 
likely in heavy use. He suggests it reverses the burden of proof of harm to the manufacturer and assumes 
scientific certainties of injury before regulation, and even then, the EPA must make an economic cost-
benefit analysis to regulate or restrict any suspected endocrine disrupter. 
The 1970s represented a time when risk aversion was publicly and politically salient (D. Vogel, 
2012); this decade was the birth of many legislative attempts to make the environment in the U.S. safer 
and to limit human impact on it. As stated before, these are the auspices of which Monsanto’s glyphosate 
herbicide, Roundup, found itself. The literature suggests that glyphosate was and is safe by all 
appropriate testing measures that the EPA has put in place. Some environmental activist groups and 
journalists of the time seemed skeptical of implementation, but pleased that it was finally on the political 
agenda. More recently, however, scientists and cynics alike question the constructions of safety within the 
TSCA, Food Quality Protection Act, Clean Water Act, and many others. This contextualization of the 
adoption of Roundup is not exhaustive, and admittedly confusing (there is a lot of overlap in which acts 
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restrict which chemicals), but represents a fair cross-section of the discourse at the time and more 
recently.  
Roundup and Roundup Ready Crops. Glyphosate was discovered in 1970 and subsequently 
Roundup was registered in the U.S. in 1976. Glyphosate was re-registered in 1993 (“EPA R.E.D. Facts 
Glyphosate,” 1993), and the first commercial biotech seed was produced by Monsanto in 1996—the 
Roundup Ready soybean (“Agronomic Practices,” 2015). The Roundup ready crop has been genetically 
engineered to be used synergistically with glyphosate based herbicides. Robb Fraley represents one of 
the trio of scientists who discovered the genes that allow a plant to be glyphosate resistant and 
successfully inserted the genes into the soybean (Robin, 2010). The science of gene insertion from one 
plant to another is necessary to the counter discourses and will be discussed in Chapter Three; however, 
it is germane to understanding the dominant discourse only in that the resulting crop has been deemed 
“substantially equivalent” to its conventional counterpart (Bereano, 2014; O’Neil, 2014) or “generally 
regarded as safe” (GRAS) (Acosta, 2014).  
As it currently stands in the US, there are no specific federal laws or acts that govern Roundup 
Ready crops or other genetically modified foodstuffs (D. Vogel, 2012; Acosta, 2014). The Law Library of 
Congress states, 
the United States does not have any federal legislation that is specific to genetically modified 
organisms (GMOs).  Rather, GMOs are regulated pursuant to health, safety, and environmental 
legislation governing conventional products.  The US approach to regulating GMOs is premised 
on the assumption that regulation should focus on the nature of the products, rather than the 
process in which they were produced. (Acosta, 2014)  
Genetically modified (GM) crops enjoy ubiquity in the U.S. and have become an integral part of 
the industrialized agricultural economy. The U.S. is the world’s leading producer of GM crops and seed, 
as of 2012, the U.S. accounted for over 40%--roughly 69.5 million hectares of GM crops—of the world’s 
GM crop production (Acosta, 2014). “In 2013, 93% of the soybeans, 90% of the cotton, and 90% of the 
corn grown in the US were genetically engineered for either herbicide tolerance or insect resistance” 
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(Acosta, 2014). GM food crops are GRAS presumptively by the FDA; the FDA only requires premarket 
approval as a food additive if the GM crop is substantially different from its conventional counterpart in 
structure, function, or composition. As of this writing, there is no federal mandate to label GM foodstuffs 
and any bill that has been introduced into Congress has fizzled quickly (Acosta, 2014). State attempts to 
regulate and label GM foodstuffs have also fizzled. GM crops and foods have been available on store 
shelves for nearly 20 years with no adverse effects being documented; perhaps there is no need for 
regulation and labeling of GM crops (Entine, 2014a).  
 There is a veil of safety in the U.S. regarding the safety of pesticides and the transgenic crops 
that are designed to withstand them. According to one of Monsanto’s YouTube (i.e., Roundup Ready 
PLUS channel on YouTube) channels, the company is releasing new seeds that are resistant to more 
pesticides than just Roundup. For all intents and purposes, these practices are safe in the U.S., and the 
previous section outlined how the standards of safety, risk, and exposure have been understood. These 
points on the timeline of Monsanto’s Roundup are key to understanding that conceptualization of safety 
within the dominant discourse. 
Dominant Discourse 
 
Figure 1 Screenshot of Monsanto's discover.monsanto.com landing page 
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In 2014, around the mid-term elections of 2014 based on the company’s Facebook page, 
Monsanto launched a page designed to allow free exchange between the company and consumers called 
Discover Monsanto. The page is colorful, with a series of different colored circles that are arranged in a 
pattern that is reminiscent of a cornucopia full of produce. Recently, as seen in the above screen shot, 
Monsanto updated the page to include a menu to link the reader to different topics such as “Food & 
Nutrition,” “Sustainability & The Environment,” and “The Growing Population.” There are a few other links 
that one can click on, but these three topics are relevant to the dominant discourse because Monsanto 
views itself to be in the nexus of food, nutrition, sustainability, the environment, and especially the 
growing population. 
In October of 2013, Rob Fraley of Monsanto accepted the World Food Prize because of his work 
on Roundup Ready seeds. The Monsanto Company YouTube account uploaded a video of Robb Fraley 
discussing the World Food Prize, the need for more sustainable agricultural practices, and the need for 
more transparency between the consumer and the company. The Discover Monsanto site is likely part of 
this growing image of transparency. Rob Fraley says “at Monsanto, it probably took us a little longer than 
it should have to realize that people today expect full transparency about where their food comes from” 
(Monsanto Company, 2013). His sentiments and the inception of the Discover Monsanto site represent a 
slight shift in discourse deployment for Monsanto, but it fundamentally does not change their world view. 
Monsanto views itself as a savior of sorts to the farmer. The company has dedicated a website 
and several YouTube videos to recognizing the hard work of the farmer. For example, there is a website 
titled America’s Farmers that is owned and run by Monsanto that appears to serve as a reminder to 
everyone that farmers are integral to the American way. Farmers are the beginning of everything, from 
the food that one eats to the clothes that one wears.  
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Figure 2 Screenshot of Monsanto's America's Farmers landing page 
 In addition to that, Monsanto has published several commercials to their Americas Farmers 
YouTube page (i.e., America’s Farmers YouTube channel) that use instrumental music and a woman’s 
voice to remind the viewer that American farmers are far removed from most people, but farmers are 
taking care of “us” (America’s Farmers, 2013). The America’s Farmers account has many videos 
introducing the viewer to an American farmer and his family. The imagery is bucolic, with long shots of the 
crops and close up framing of the livestock. Frequently, the children of the farmers are discussing how 
hard their parents work to feed America and what dedicated parents they are. These videos serve to 
humanize the American farmer, as though he had be vilified. Humanizing the American farmer is akin to 
humanizing Monsanto by extension. Rob Fraley’s promise of transparency when paired with Discover 
Monsanto and American Farmer campaigns seems to be suited to soften the company in the public view. 
In recent years, Monsanto has been the subject of several documentaries (e.g., Food Inc. and GMO 
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OMG) and activist campaigns like March against Monsanto, these deployments serve two purposes: 
softening the company’s public image and gaining the trust of the American people.  
Necessity of GMOs. This sentiment is echoed throughout the company’s main website and 
YouTube account both domestically and internationally. On their YouTube account, a video titled “The 
World We Share” reminds the viewer that the world is home to over seven billion people and sharing 
resources is the only way for the human race to survive. In fact, many of the 327 videos available on 
Monsanto’s YouTube account are about the international farming community and Monsanto’s efforts to 
improve lives in third world countries. These videos generally use faces of the country it is focused on to 
discuss the company’s efforts and impacts, a tactic that offers credibility of the claims being made (e.g., 
Monsanto Company, 2014a). In this particular video, the focus is less on Monsanto’s products and more 
on the community impact which serves to obfuscate rather than educate. These sorts of videos that focus 
more on projects and potential impacts on a presumably small community with no mention of the product 
in question suggest that it is less of an advertisement and more of a PR piece to convince Westerners 
that Monsanto and its products are altruistic and good indeed.  
Some of the videos center on the technology of Monsanto specifically (i.e., Roundup Ready 
seeds and BT seeds) or focuses on community improvement efforts (e.g., agricultural schools, clean 
water efforts). These videos serve to extend Monsanto’s worldview that the company is indeed saving the 
farmer, and by extension, the world. It is interesting that Monsanto is purporting a complex world view 
suggesting that humans and the environment are intertwined, and more interesting is that this world view 
also indicts everyone as a responsible party to sustainability. Stauber and Renton (1995) suggest this is a 
PR tactic to lessen the responsibility of a company to its externalities, but it seems that Monsanto is 
positing that every person has to make sustainable choices in how one chooses food and how one lives, 
without forgetting that Monsanto’s products are part of a sustainable agricultural program. 
Monsanto’s discourse deployment is done primarily through its various websites (e.g., 
discover.monsanto.com and americanfarmers.com) and social media (e.g., YouTube and Facebook). The 
primary discussion Monsanto puts forth is sustainable agriculture for a growing population. According to a 
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video of Robb Fraley, there will be nine billion people on the earth come 2050 (Monsanto Company, 
2014b), Monsanto sees itself as pivotal to feeding all those people. Currently, the discussion of feeding 
the world is conspicuously absent of an in-depth conversation surrounding the company’s technology and 
products. Additionally, the star product, Roundup, is rarely discussed in Monsanto’s campaigns, more 
than likely because of its long established safety. However, even in discussing GMOs, Monsanto rarely 
talks about the science of GMO seeds or Roundup Ready seeds specifically. The company strategically 
leaves out the science of biotechnology because the controversy in the public realm is not about the 
science and allows for Monsanto to establish its products as safe without begging the question from 
consumers about Roundup.  
Safety of Roundup and GMOs. How does Monsanto articulate safety for its star herbicide? 
Monsanto provides a variety of press release-style documents on its website, frequently titled 
“Backgrounder,” sometimes these are simply informative pieces or written specifically to defend products 
that have been indicted by independent research. Several of the Backgrounder releases form the basis of 
Monsanto’s discourse of safety as they often establish and re-establish Roundup and glyphosate as safe 
according to current toxicology standards.   
The culture of safety of Roundup centers on a seminal literature review performed by Williams, 
Kroes, and Munro (2000), the review is cited several times in Monsanto’s Backgrounder series. The trio 
performed a peer-reviewed safety and risk assessment of glyphosate and Roundup herbicides. In doing 
so, the trio reviewed studies submitted by Monsanto to regulatory bodies worldwide, reports from 
regulatory and scientific organizational bodies, and a “wide array of studies conducted by independent 
researchers using information obtained from public literature.” Williams et al (2000) reviewed 188 studies 
over two years to comprehensively evaluate glyphosate. In performing their risk assessment, the 
researchers reviewed literature,  
The key findings of the study are as follows:  
• Glyphosate is not carcinogenic 
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• Roundup herbicide, like glyphosate, has very low acute toxicity, which means very high 
exposure is required to cause an adverse effect 
• Under present and expected conditions of use, Roundup herbicide does not pose a health 
risk to humans  
• Glyphosate does not bioaccumulate 
Glyphosate does not adversely affect reproduction or development  
• Children are not at greater risk unless they work or live on a farm  
• There is no evidence of endocrine disruption, and  
• There is no synergistic adverse effect. (“Summary of Human Risk Assessment and Safety 
Evaluation on Glyphosate and Roundup herbicide,” 2005) 
Furthermore, Monsanto has listed many more Backgrounders to quell any question of safety (see 
http://www.monsanto.com/products/pages/Roundup-safety-background-materials.aspx for review). The 
Backgrounder titled “Glyphosate and Standard Toxicology Studies” (2002) goes into the specifics of 
toxicology testing of the herbicide, demarcating exposures to acute, sub-chronic, and chronic. Within the 
discussion of standard toxicology, Monsanto also reminds us of the Food Quality Protection Act of 1996, 
which lowered acceptable human exposure to pesticides to levels that factor in exposure to infants and 
children. The U.S. EPA has concluded, based on standard toxicology reports, that glyphosate-based 
herbicides posed risk of increased sensitivity in children, and therefore adults (“Glyphosate and Standard 
Toxicology Studies,” 2002). In Monsanto’s discourse Williams, Kroes, and Munro (2000) serve as its 
authorities, these Toxicologists are cited in numerous places on Monsanto’s website to remind the reader 
of Roundup’s safety.  
 The culture of safety within Monsanto is a top priority, of course, and Monsanto is compliant with 
EPA and FDA guidelines for both their herbicide formulations and Roundup Ready System. The dominant 
safety discourse appears to be informed and built upon standards set up by federal agencies. It also 
appears to be limited to standards set up by the USDA, FDA, and EPA. There is limited discussion of 
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standards of safety in other countries, at least in the Backgrounder series. However, as stated previously, 
the Backgrounders also address independent research that may implicate Roundup in adverse health 
effects. Journal articles that suggest Roundup is linked to Hairy Cell Leukemia or non-Hodgkin’s 
Lymphoma are addressed directly (“Glyphosate: Response to non-Hodgkin’s Lymphoma Allegations,” 
2002; “Glyphosate: Response to Hairy Cell Leukemia Allegations,” 2002) and dismissed outright because 
of junk science allegations, the epidemiological studies do not meet previously established criteria for 
cause-effect relationships.  
Another study Monsanto addressed directly on their website is “Differential effects of glyphosate 
and Roundup on human placental cells and aromatase” (Richard et al., 2005) where researchers imply 
that Roundup is “an endocrine disrupter based on effects in human tumor cells originally derived from a 
cancer of the placenta. Aromatase activity, which is required for the production of certain steroid 
hormones, was decreased when these tumor cells were exposed to high concentrations of Roundup in a 
Petri dish for 18 hours.” Monsanto writes that the study is “interesting” but has no relevance to living 
humans or animals. Extensive studies on live animals contradict the findings of Richard et al. (2005) and 
are more reflective of real world conditions. Monsanto contends that the study cannot be extrapolated to 
humans because a placental cancer cell in a Petri dish exposed to high concentrations of Roundup will 
behave “vastly different[ly].” The author goes on to say “the concentration of Roundup reported to have 
caused a reduction in aromatase activity was orders of magnitude granter than would results from the 
highest possible human exposure under real conditions. The direct exposure used in this study 
intentionally bypasses normal processes limiting absorption and cellular exposure and avoids normal 
metabolism, digestion, and excretion that would protect cells from the minute amounts of chemical.” The 
author of the Backgrounder cites several more studies to expose Richard et al.’s (2005) work as bad 
science and concludes that Roundup will not disrupt steroid synthesis in vivo under biologically relevant 
conditions (“Glyphosate: Response to “differential effects of glyphosate and Roundup on human placental 
cells and aromatase,” 2005). 
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Companies want to protect their investments, so it stands to reason that Monsanto would and will 
defend Roundup against supposed bad science. Interestingly, the Backgrounder series does not include 
topics on the Roundup Ready System, also known as Roundup Ready seeds in this writing. This may be 
because the FDA and EPA generally regard GM crops as safe and only the regulation of Roundup is at 
risk? Of course this is conjecture, but J. Vogel (2004) previously established and suggested that 
regulation prioritizes the science over public safety. The Backgrounder series produced by Monsanto 
seems to reiterate this regulatory priority of getting the science right and in the absence of certainty of 
harm, Roundup should be and is regarded as safe.  
The TCSA approval by Congress came with specific restrictions on PCBs, a nearly indestructible 
chemical so persistent it bioaccumulates in humans and the food chain. As of 1973, one out of every two 
Americans had PCBs in their system (Mintz, 1975). Monsanto is the only manufacturer of PCBs in the US 
and had voluntarily stopped making and selling PCBs as of 1975 (Mintz, 1975). This move reminds 
readers that Monsanto has made safety of humans and the environment a priority in the past and will 
continue to do so. The PCB events in particular in Monsanto’s history are a point of contention for its 
critics; this will be explored further in Chapter Three. 
Monsanto seems to be painfully aware of its links to the past of unregulated toxic chemical use; 
the history of the company web page outlines its history from an agricultural point of view. Beginning in 
1901, when the company was founded by John F. Queeny, the timeline is scant of information of the 
company until 1987. It’s suggestive that Monsanto has only ever been an agricultural company. To 
reconcile this, there is a blurb at the top of the page that says “Monsanto is a relatively new company. 
While we share the name and history of a company that was funding in 1901, the Monsanto of today is 
focused on agriculture and supporting farmers around the world in their mission to produce more while 
conserving more. We’re an agricultural company” (“Company History,” 2013). Hugh Grant (2013), the 
current CEO of Monsanto, exalts the farmer and Monsanto’s place as the farmer’s advocate in the 2012 
Sustainability Report while also discussing Monsanto’s place in the future of sustainable agriculture. The 
report calls for people to continue to support the farmer, as the farmer is “a quiet, unwavering figure” in 
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the midst of a growing population and dwindling resources. Monsanto is committed to supporting the 
farmer to produce and conserve more and create safe, sustainable, healthy, and affordable foodstuffs. 
Sustainability is at the heart of Monsanto’s vision of “produce more, conserve more, and improve lives,” 
and as such, influences every action the company takes in both local and global agricultural networks. 
Over the last 5 years, Monsanto has managed to deliver sustainable yield goals to the world, and plans to 
do more. Hugh Grant (2013) is extremely proud of the work his employees and company have done. 
Exploring Monsanto’s website, social media accounts, and various PR campaigns makes one 
thing clear: Monsanto is creating products that they believe are beneficial to the world. The view of the 
world from Monsanto’s is a grim one where people are already starving and more will starve without 
Monsanto’s intervention. The intervention is biotechnology, and unfortunately, the worldview is absent of 
what that technology actually entails. There are no videos on YouTube or webpages on Monsanto’s web 
pages discussing how these products will specifically end hunger in food insecure nations. It almost 
appears to be unimportant to Monsanto how their products fit into saving the world; perhaps people just 
need to trust that the amount of transparency the company offers is enough.  
Journalists Confused for Scientists. Monsanto’s deployment of the dominant discourse is 
powerful and persuasive, but underdeveloped if some of the other methods of deployment to propagate 
the dominant discourse were excluded. Much of this is done through popular press publishing such as 
Forbes and The New Yorker. One particular author that is prolific in his writing on the topics is John 
Entine. John Entine is especially interesting not because his writing is so scathing and skeptical of any 
counter-discourse regarding GMOs (and really any sort of counter-discourse regarding science in 
general), but because of his ties to the Genetic Literacy Project. The Genetic Literacy Project says of 
itself, 
The Genetic Literacy Project is a non-profit organization funded by grants from non-partisan 
foundations. We also accept donations from individuals. We have no ties to and accept no 
support money from corporations. The GLP is affiliated with the 5013c non-profit Sense About 
Science-US, which oversees STATS and supplies administrative support for the GLP. Executive 
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Director Jon Entine is Senior Fellow at the World Food Center’s Institute for Food and Agricultural 
Literacy at the University of California-Davis. (“Mission,” 2014)  
Jon Entine, while not directly connected to Monsanto and the deployment of its discourse, has a long 
history of being charged as a “corporate crony” (“Manufactured scientific debate, third-party experts, and 
Jon Entine,” 2013).  
Despite the charges against the author, Jon Entine publishes opinion-editorials in major new 
publications such as Forbes and Huffington Post regarding GMOs and many other science topics like 
Fracking and Bee Colony Collapse (generally favoring the industry’s point-of-view). Conveniently, Entine 
was especially productive and vocal about GMO technology in the months leading up the 2014 election 
which include several state measures to require labeling of GMOs. Entine frequently cites scientific 
studies in his work, but one article in particular deserved special attention. The article titled “The debate 
about GMO safety is over, thanks to a new trillion-meal study” published in September of 2014 on 
Forbes.com cites a study that has yet be located for the interest of this thesis. The lack of access to the 
report Entine (2014a) cites is dubious at best, but it conflates Entine (2014a) with scientist in the dominant 
discourse deployment. 
In addition to Jon Entine, other authors represent the proliferation of a dominant worldview of 
progress in the face of scientific uncertainty—the aforementioned notion that science must have 
quantifiable evidence of harm before limiting or prohibiting a practice. These authors include Michael 
Specter (2014), author of a severe account of Dr. Vandana Shiva, the golden child of the Anti-GMO 
movement published in the summer of 2014 for The New Yorker; Henry Miller and Drew Kershen (2014) 
also wrote a similar piece for Forbes shortly before Specter. These skeptics fill a gap in Monsanto’s 
worldview; Monsanto has had a history of directly addressing science that interfered with their products 
like Roundup, as one can see on its Backgrounder series, but the Backgrounder series never addresses 
the safety of GMOs nor public opinion on either GMOs or Roundup. The short list of journalists represents 
the direct address of GMO counter-discourses. As long as there are journalists reproducing the dominant 
discourse regarding GMOs, Monsanto does not have to directly address the public’s concerns or the anti-
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GMO discourse at large. At the very least, this dominant worldview discourse as represented in popular 
press demonstrates the far reaching ability for a discourse to proliferate. Seemingly unconnected authors 
replicating the worldview of a seemingly unconnected multi-national agribusiness company serves to 
validate and solidify the dominant discourse.  
Conclusion 
 This chapter reviewed pieces of legislation that established acceptable levels of safety and set 
the stage in understanding risk and exposure. It’s important to recall the dismantling of the Delaney 
Clause because this was potentially the most powerful piece of legislation passed that protected the 
public. The Delaney Clause established a zero-tolerance policy for potential carcinogens and it was 
dismantled because it could hinder progress in the science community. This marks a sharp turn in 
understanding precautionary politics in the US and a change in the scientific establishment of harm—that 
the FDA should establish minimum exposure levels of demonstrable harm. The FDA is woefully 
understaffed and too underfunded to establish the minimums itself so it is up to companies to determine 
the thresholds of harm and report them to the FDA. This is a conflict of interest in public safety, but this is 
the umbrella of safety in the world as of this writing. It is also the environment in which Roundup Ready 
seeds have been deemed safe. 
 Monsanto has been a very successful agribusiness in this environment, with Roundup being 
approved for commercial and domestic use in 1974 (“History of Monsanto’s Glyphosate Herbicide,” 2005) 
shortly before the Toxic Substances Control Act of 1976. The TSCA was long awaited legislation to 
protect the public from harm—harm that Rachel Carson (1962) discussed in Silent Spring—and to 
establish a culture of safety before progress. In the 1970s, presumably because of Rachel Carson (1962) 
and subsequent fallout, public awareness of toxic substances was extremely high and thus many pieces 
of legislation were passed in regards to protecting the public. Roundup was established as safe, and 
there was no reason to question it when it was approved for use during a high tide of public and political 
awareness. No one questioned it; at least that is the way it appears in the archives of newspapers. At the 
time of the TSCA, PCBs were the hot topic and rightly so. Following the fallout from Silent Spring, 
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Roundup was approved and ushered into use because it was the answer to a toxic environment that 
people were becoming increasingly aware of. 
 Monsanto discusses Roundup as the most tested molecule in existence (“History of Monsanto’s 
Glyphosate Herbicide,” 2005), and as such it is safe. The discourse of science rhetoric (J. Vogel, 2004; S. 
Vogel, 2008) and Roundup are tightly intertwined as the focus of getting the science right is more 
important the potential implication of the results. Monsanto’s readers, both supporters and critics, can see 
through its website that this culture of scientific rigor is important. If the science is right, then the chemical 
is harmless and it is reasonable to consider Roundup Ready crops as safe.  
 Monsanto’s discourse is persuasive because it requires very little critical analysis from its 
subscribers, in other words, it is easier to believe the dominant discourse than to question the safety of 
food grown in the US and countries that the US imports food from. Weasel (2008) suggests that the 
cognitive miser is one who uses cognitive shortcuts (i.e., MO labels) to make decisions regarding safety; 
cognitive misers will go with what makes one’s life easier. Embracing Monsanto’s dominant world view of 
safety is easier than questioning every packaged food in the US, and this makes the dominant discourse 






This chapter aims to discuss the counter discourses operating against the Monsanto agricultural 
assemblage of Roundup and Roundup Ready crops. With a particular focus on the contested history of 
the company itself, this chapter delves into the dominant counter discourses of safety arguing against the 
benefits and necessity of Monsanto’s agricultural assemblage of Roundup and Roundup Ready seeds. 
There are several counter discourses of interest to this chapter, primarily the “scientific” counter discourse 
and the “populist” counter discourse. The populist discourse rises from popular media sites such as 
documentaries and social media. The scientific counter discourse articulates resistance indirectly through 
experiments and epidemiological studies that cast doubt on Monsanto’s safety assurances. The populist 
counter discourse draws upon the scientific counter discourse as scientific studies demonstrating adverse 
health effects are taken up and reproduced in populist voices. Taken together, the scientific and populist 
counter discourses resist the preferred narrative of Monsanto’s agricultural assemblage and may be 
regarded as collectively constituting a supra counter discourse.   
The supra counter discourse, is promoted by diverse agents,  including scientists Árpád Pusztai, 
Gilles-Eric Séralini, and Vandana Shiva, and Percy Schmeiser, the Canadian farmer who was sued by 
Monsanto. Schmeiser rises to the position of folk hero in the populist counter discourse. Despite their 
disparate voices, the scientific and populist counter-discourses collectively resist Monsanto’s narrative of 
safety by questioning the efficacy of federal regulatory bodies, as well as lack of independent research. 
Monsanto’s dominant discourse asserts that the world will need more food by 2050 to feed nine billion 
people, the counter discourses collectively reject this premise and suggest that current agricultural 
practices already yield enough food for more than nine billion people. In addition to the supra counter 
discourse, there are alternative agricultural visions that resist Monsanto’s discourse such as marker 
assisted breeding and agroecology. This chapter will explicate the supra counter discourse more fully and 




Contested History of Monsanto 
The history of the company is where most counter discourse discussions begin, and perhaps for 
good reason, it seems as though Monsanto has chosen to omit what it produced previously and how 
many lawsuits it has been involved in—again this is according to its own website (“Company History,” 
2013). Monsanto’s own history, according to its website, is scant of events prior to the inception of 
Roundup, including PCBs (“Company History,” 2013). Monsanto writes of itself that it is a relatively new 
company despite being founded in 1901, 
Monsanto is a relatively new company. While we share the name and history of a company that 
was founded in 1901, the Monsanto of today is focused on agriculture and supporting farmers 
around the world in their mission to produce more while conserving more. We’re an agricultural 
company. Below is an interactive presentation with photos, videos and Monsanto stories. We 
invite you to explore the Monsanto history today. (“Company History,” 2013) 
Many critics start their villainization of Monsanto with its supposed dubious history. Monsanto was 
founded in 1901 by John Francis Queeny; the namesake of the company was his wife’s maiden name, 
Monsanto. The company originally produced the now ubiquitous saccharin (“Company History,” 2013; 
Louv, 2013; Robin, 2010). Monsanto’s timeline on its “Company History” webpage (2013) glosses over 
the contested history offered by its critics. This rhetorical repositioning in its own narrative may be 
because Monsanto wrote off a $700 million dollar judgment to one of its subsidiaries, Solutia Inc., and 
then separated itself from Solutia Inc. (Robin, 2010). 
 Polychlorinated Biphenyls. Monsanto was a humble chemical company producing sweeteners 
and swiftly moved in to producing plastics, including PCBs, by 1929. During World War I, there was a 
sugar shortage and Monsanto saw saccharin take off and stock prices soared; Monsanto argued that 
saccharin was the best way for the military to save money on feeding the troops and subsequently 
civilians also started purchasing the sugar substitute (Hicks, 2010). The company grew and expanded its 
operations to include manufacture of PCB, Polychlorinated Biphenyl in 1929 (Louv, 2013: Robin, 2010). 
PCBs were a modern marvel of man-made organic compounds, and due to their  
37 
 
non-flammability, chemical stability, high boiling point, and electrical insulating properties, PCBs 
were used in hundreds of industrial and commercial applications including electrical, heat 
transfer, and hydraulic equipment; as plasticizers in paints, plastics, and rubber products; in 
pigments, dyes, and carbonless copy paper; and many other industrial applications. 
(“Polychlorinated Biphenyls,” 2014) 
According to the EPA, PCBs are found in virtually every cell in every living thing in the world and 
have been shown to cause cancer, among other adverse health effects on nearly every system in the 
human body (“Polychlorinated Biphenyls,” 2014). Monsanto was the only manufacturer of PCBs in the US 
(Robin, 2010), and the compound was ubiquitous in industrial application until it was banned in 1979 
because of how toxic and persistent it is in the environment (“Polychlorinated Biphenyls,” 2014; Robin, 
2010). Patent laws at the time allowed Monsanto to enjoy a near monopoly in the world market on PCBs; 
Monsanto sold the compound in the US as Aroclor, and PCBs were known “by the name Pyralène in 
France, Clophen in Germany, and Kanechlor in Japan” (Robin, 2010, p. 17). 
 In 1929, Anniston, Alabama became home to one of the most prolific PCB plants in the US. The 
plant was purchased by Monsanto in 1934. The plant brought jobs to an idyllic small town that previously 
had claims to the best sewer system in the US (Robin, 2010). It’s interesting to note that Robin’s (2010) 
account of Anniston is one of bucolic imagery and serenity until Monsanto moves in, which creates a 
punctuation of downfall. Today, Anniston enjoys abnormally high rates of rare cancers, learning disorders, 
reproductive problems, and a whole host of other issues (Louv, 2013; “Polychlorinated Biphenyls,” 2014; 
Robin, 2010).  
Mars Hill Baptist Church of Anniston, Alabama was approached by Monsanto and offered one 
million dollars for the property. Several members in the surrounding neighborhood had also had similar 
offers from the chemical giant. In 1996, former US Senator Donald Stewart, now a lawyer in Anniston, 
had been contacted by the residents of the west side of town and asked to come to the Mars Hill Baptist 
Church. The church and surrounding properties were located directly across from the PCB plant and the 
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residents were suspicious of Monsanto’s interest in their properties (Robin, 2010). Later it was revealed 
during the following court trial, 
From the 1930s to 1971 Monsanto manufactured polychlorinated biphenyls in a neighborhood in 
western Anniston populated mostly by poor blacks living in ramshackle wooden houses. Many of 
those who lived in the area worked at the plant, which manufactured the fire-resistant chlorine 
compounds used as coolants and lubricants in electrical equipment. During production the 
company deposited waste chemicals into landfills located on company property. (Kitchens, 2004) 
While Donald Stewart was preparing the case against Monsanto, a resident of Anniston sought 
the help of the legendary Johnnie Cochran (Kitchens, 2004; Robin, 2010).The residents of Anniston 
brought a class action lawsuit against the chemical giant and won a 700 million dollar judgment against 
Monsanto and its subsidiaries (Kitchens, 2004; Louv, 2013; Robin, 2010). 
Perhaps what is more bolstering to critics’ argument against Monsanto is not the triumph in the 
court room but rather what was revealed during the trial. Critics charge Monsanto with knowing as early 
as 1937 that PCBs were highly toxic and chose to continue producing them (Robin, 2010).  
In 1937, Dr. Emmett Kelly, Monsanto’s medical director, was invited to a meeting at the Harvard 
School of Public Health, also attended by PCB users such as Halowax and General Electric, along with 
representatives of the U.S. Public Health Service. At this meeting, Cecil K. Drinker, a Harvard researcher, 
presented the results of a study he had conducted at the request of Halowax: a year earlier, three 
employees of that company had died after being exposed to PCB fumes, and several had developed a 
terribly disfiguring skin disease, which was then unknown but later named chloracne (Robin, 2010, p. 22).  
During the trial, an additional half a million internal documents were released showing that 
Monsanto knew of the danger but decided to continue manufacturing the compound as well as diversify to 
prepare for the eventual revelation that the company had contaminated an entire community (Robin, 
2010). Anniston, Alabama is now home to an EPA Superfund Site still in the process of being 
decontaminated (“Anniston PCB Site,” 2013).  
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 Agent Orange and Dioxin. The infamous defoliant, Agent Orange, also manufactured in part by 
Monsanto, enjoys a similar dubious history. Agent Orange was used during the Vietnam War in North 
Vietnam and part of South Vietnam to reduce forest coverage for guerilla style attacks from the 
Vietnamese (Robin, 2010). The defoliant is equal parts 2,4,5-Trichlorophenol (2,4,5-T) and 2,4-
Dichlorophenoxyacetic acid (2,4-D) (Robin, 2010). US President John F Kennedy authorized the use of 
the defoliant at the behest of the President of South Vietnam, the operation was dubbed “Operation 
Ranch Hand” (Louv, 2013; Robin, 2010). Agent Orange is infamous for its alleged ties to high rates of 
cancer and birth defects in those exposed including US Military personnel. Monsanto is of particular 
interest in the Agent Orange debacle because their 2,4,5-T pesticide was manufactured and 
contaminated by 2,3,7,8-Tetrachlorodibenzodioxin (TCDD) or as it is commonly referred to as dioxin.  
 Operation Ranch Hand officially began on January 13th, 1962 with the first barrels of Agent 
Orange arriving in July of the previous year in Saigon. At the time, the Government claimed the two 
herbicides were safe to use synergistically in destroying foliage along roadways, waterways, and 
destroying crops that were feeding the Viet Cong (Robin, 2010). “Between [1962] and 1971, an estimated 
20 million gallons of defoliants were sprayed on 8 million acres of forests and crops. More than three 
thousand villages were contaminated, and 60 percent of the defoliants used were Agent Orange, which is 
the equivalent of more than eight hundred pounds of pure dioxin” (Robin, 2010, p. 45). For reference, a 
2003 study published by Columbia University suggests just eighty grams of dioxin dissolved in municipal 
water can eliminate a city of eight million people (“Le Monde provides precedent for an Agent Orange 
payout,” 2005; Robin, 2010).  
 According to several critics (Louv, 2013; Robin, 2010) the issues of Monsanto’s dioxin 
manufacture is not the production itself but rather the fervent attempt to maintain its discourse of safety, 
There are numerous accounts of dioxin contamination damage such as the Times Beach Superfund site 
and the Italian Seveso plant explosion.  
Another incident that the dominant counter discourse utilizes to make its case is what happened 
to Times Beach, Missouri. Times Beach was an idyllic beachfront town that in 1971 had the roads paved 
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by Bliss Waste, using industrial waste from surrounding companies to create its pavement, primarily 
Monsanto (Louv, 2013; Robin, 2010). Shortly after Bliss Waste paved the roads for the town, hundreds of 
domestic animals and local wildlife died. The EPA had been contacted but neglected to come until two 
children fell extremely ill post paving. The EPA’s testing of suspected contaminated materials revealed 
“alarming levels of toxic products: 1,590 ppm of PCBs, 5,000 ppm of 2,4,5-T (a powerful herbicide 
manufactured by Monsanto), and 30 ppm of dioxin” (Robin, 2010, p. 35). The dioxin contamination was 
300 times the limit set by the EPA. People were experiencing issues including but not limited to 
chloracne, hypothyroidism, and cancer. The residents of Times Beach attempted to sue, however, 
Monsanto claimed there was no way to track the contaminants back to the company, and the case was 
dismissed (Robin, 2010).  
In addition to the Times Beach disaster, critics argue the Seveso disaster in Italy should have 
alerted Monsanto to harms of 2,4,5-T and dioxin. On July 10th, 1976 in the Italian chemical factory in 
Icmesa owned by multinational Hoffmann-La Roche, there was an explosion in the factory that left a 
mysterious orange cloud over the town. A cloud of dioxin had been released over the town of Seveso, 
and within days “more than three thousand domestic animals died of poisoning, while dozens of residents 
developed chloracne” (Robin, 2010, p. 39).Hoffman-La Roche later revealed their manufacture of the 
herbicide 2,4,5-T also derived dioxin, introducing the world to the previously unknown compound (Robin, 
2010).   
While Monsanto was not responsible for the Seveso catastrophe and could not be unequivocally 
tied to the Times Beach event, these events should have alerted the company to the danger of its 
production of Agent Orange and 2,4,5-T. At least, that is what those arguing for skepticism of Monsanto 
suggest,  
Not only did Monsanto fail to call into question the manufacture of 2,4,5-T, but the company did 
not hesitate to work closely with Pentagon strategists to develop its use as a chemical weapon. 
Following a Freedom of Information Act request to the Pentagon, the St. Louis Journalism Review 
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revealed in 1998 that Monsanto had conducted a regular correspondence beginning in 1950 with 
the Chemical Warfare Service dealing with the military use of the herbicide. (Robin, 2010, p. 41) 
 Monsanto had its own explosion in 1948 that also would have alerted the company to the hazards 
of dioxin. In fact, critics claim the company knew about the hazards because following the explosion in the 
Monsanto-owned 2,4,5-T factory in Nitro, West Virginia, Monsanto hired Dr. Raymond Suskind from the 
Kettering Laboratory to perform a “discreet medical follow-up of the affected personnel” (Robin, 2010, p. 
36). The affected personnel, which included both those exposed in the explosion and those involved in 
the clean-up that followed, developed experienced nausea, vomiting, headaches, and developed 
chloracne, a previously unknown skin disease. Suskind’s report, which was presented to Monsanto on 
December 5th, 1949 but kept secret until the mid-1980s trial Kemner v. Monsanto, showed that seventy-
seven people employed at the factory had developed what is now known as chloracne and other 
symptoms; Suskind suggested that the mysterious skin disease was a direct result of the exposure 
(Robin, 2010).  
 Suskind continued to secretly follow-up with six particularly affected individuals in 1950, these 
individuals had also developed respiratory problems, liver problems, central nervous system troubles, 
impotence, and skin so dark that one worker reported being mistaken for African American. Robin (2010) 
traces Suskind’s work for Monsanto from 1953 to 1976, which eventually expanded the cohort to thirty-six 
workers. Of the thirty-six in the cohort, thirteen had died at the average age of fifty-four as of the Kemner 
v. Monsanto trial (Robin, 2010). Similar to the way the company handled PCBs, Monsanto “hid the data in 
a drawer and said nothing to the health authorities and certainly not to its workers” (Robin, 2010, p. 37).  
 Gerson Smoger, a lawyer that has represented many Vietnam veterans harmed by dioxin, has 
specialized in environmental pollution cases including the Times Beach case. Smoger suggests that not 
only did Monsanto know of the problems of dioxin, the company deliberately concealed it from 
Government health officials. His proof is an internal confidential memorandum dated February 22,1965 
from Dow, the other manufacturer of Agent Orange, noting the toxicity tests of 2,4,5-T on rabbits had 
shown development of severe liver lesions. This document asked whether or not to inform the 
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Government. The memorandum made record of criticism Dow received from Monsanto regarding 
revealing the secret of dioxin (Robin, 2010).  
 Additionally, a 1970 National Institutes of Health study found that mice subjected to 2,4,5-T 
developed fetal malformations and stillbirths (Robin, 2010). The study showed that 2,4,5-T “adversely 
affects the development and viability of the mouse and rat fetus” (Courtney, Gaylor, Hogan, Falk, Bates & 
Mitchell, 1970, p. 866). This study seems to have punctuated the use of 2,4,5-T and its end.  
 In 1978, the first class-action lawsuit was brought forth by Vietnam veterans against Monsanto 
and it was dismissed because the plaintiffs could not prove dioxin was to blame. In 1979, a derailed 
freight train in Sturgeon, Missouri contaminated the entire community with dioxin, leading to another 
class-action lawsuit by sixty-five residents of Sturgeon (Robin, 2010). These events were on the heels of 
the Seveso, Italy contamination; dioxin had previously enjoyed quiet ubiquity but it was now in the 
forefront of the media. According to Robin (2010), Monsanto doubled up on obfuscation. The company 
hired Raymond Suskind to perform yet another study on the survivors of the Nitro factory explosion, and 
in 1978 Suskind supervised three epidemiological studies, which were then reviewed and published by 
Dr. George Roush—Monsanto’s medical director—in 1980, 1983, and 1984. The studies concluded there 
was no connection between 2,4,5-T and cancer (Robin, 2010).  
 The studies published by Roush are the primary reason that Vietnam veterans had been denied 
reparations in their first class-action lawsuit against Monsanto. In a twist of events, the Kemner v. 
Monsanto trial revealed that the 1980, 1983, and 1984 studies supervised by Suskind and reviewed by 
Roush were indeed severely flawed,  
The group of those “exposed” included only the workers present on the day of the accident that 
had also contracted chloracne; those who had been present but had not gotten the disease were 
excluded from the group, whereas Suskind knew perfectly well that the absence of chloracne did 
not necessarily imply lack of exposure. Conversely, anyone with skin problems (psoriasis, acne, 
and the like) was included in the cohort of the “exposed,” whereas workers on the production line 
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who were absent on the day of the accident were systematically placed in the control group of the 
“not exposed,” even if they were suffering from chloracne. (Robin, 2010, p. 50) 
The study published in 1983 […] was supposed to compare the state of health of 884 of 
the factory’s employees, including those working on the 2,4,5-T production line (the “exposed” 
group) and “all the others” (the control group), including “employees holding a job having plant-
wide responsibilities with the potential for exposure to 2,4,5-T were, for the purposes of this study, 
considered to be non-exposed,” as the two authors acknowledged. The result was that rates of 
cancer were lower in the exposed group than in the non-exposed group. The trick was having 
included in the study only employees working in the factory and/or having died between January 
1, 1955, and December 31, 1977. In other words, those who had worked at Nitro between 1948 
and 1955 were excluded, as were those who died after 1977. This arbitrary protocol made it 
possible to exclude from the study twenty workers who Monsanto knew had been exposed 
(notably in the 1949 accident), nine of whom had died of cancer and eleven of heart disease. 
Furthermore, four workers who had died of cancer and had been classified as “exposed” 
in the 1980 study were placed in the control group in the 1983 study […] The [study] published in 
1984 by Raymond Suskind and Vicki Hertzberg, a colleague at the Kettering Laboratory, in the 
prestigious Journal of the American Medical Association crossed all bounds. At a hearing in the 
Kemner case, Roush acknowledged that instead of the four cases of cancer recorded in the 
exposed group, there were twenty-eight (the other twenty-four had been omitted for some 
reason). (Robin, 2010, p. 51) 
According to the supra counter discourse, the studies revealed during the trial are a farce to protect 
Monsanto from lawsuits and demonstrate the lengths to which the company has gone to and will likely do 
again. 
Marie-Monique Robin’s (2010) account of the aforementioned events presents a well-developed 
and well-researched history of the conglomerate, her work encompasses a great deal of others’ work as 
well as her own conclusions. Many organizations such a Food Democracy Now and March against 
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Monsanto utilize her book The World According to Monsanto (Robin, 2010) to argue against any 
regulation that favors Monsanto and its agricultural assemblage. This thesis utilized a great deal of her 
work to describe the starting point of the supra counter discourse for these reasons. The above writing is 
the hidden history of Monsanto, a history that is not listed on their company history page nor is it in such 
great detail on its Wikipedia page, events that can be corroborated by court documents but conveniently 
forgotten about. Critics are all too eager to remind their audience of what Monsanto has said of its 
products, what it has done, and what the company has been convicted of.  
Organizations critical of Monsanto (e.g., GMWatch.org and Food Democracy Now) that have 
rallied around fighting the rhetoric of GMOs and Monsanto always begin by reminding the reader that the 
company has deceived in the past and will likely continue to deceive (“Monsanto: A History,” 2014). This 
sort of rallying point asks the reader to examine a great deal about their assumptions of not only the 
necessity of GMOs and Roundup but also whether or not the technology of GMOs and Roundup are truly 
safe. Monsanto established safety of Roundup and Roundup Ready seeds in Chapter Two of this thesis 
as the supra counter discourse challenges the same establishment of safety in Chapter Three by the 
counter discourse authors. Monsanto’s declaration of safety relies on EPA regulation of Roundup as a 
pesticide and a seminal toxicology literature review by Williams, Kroes, and Munro (2000) that reviewed 
188 studies on the herbicide. The regulation of Roundup Ready seeds is like that of conventional crops 
because the Roundup Ready crops are GRAS (Acosta, 2014; Bereano, 2014; O’Neil, 2014). 
Rearticulating Safety 
 David Vogel (2012) quotes George W. Bush in discussing the precautionary principle “if we wait 
for threats to fully materialize, we will have waited too long” (p. 19).  
 Bush was addressing the US Military Academy’s Class of 2002 in his commencement address 
when he was quoted with the above, he was discussing terrorism in a post-9/11 world (Gilmore, 2002). 
The turn of phrase is useful in conceptualizing the angst and anxiety that critics of GMOs feel about 
Monsanto, Roundup, and Roundup Ready crops. The next section explores the counter discourse of 
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safety, first examining the counter discourse surrounding distrust of federal agencies, such as the EPA, 
and then examining the counter discourse developed by scientists and grassroots campaigns. 
Suspect Federal Agencies 
 Monsanto describes the safety of its products by recalling studies that have shown Roundup to 
be safe and EPA approved. Authors of both populist and scientific counter discourses take issue with this 
declaration because it seems to be the same circular logic as seen with dioxin and 2,4,5-T, these 
Monsanto products are safe because Monsanto says they are safe. The studies Suskind supervised were 
ultimately discredited, the experimental group and control group were conflated to show that there was no 
link of dioxin and cancer or negative health outcomes (Robin, 2010). Worse still, these fraudulent studies 
were the basis of the EPA’s classification of dioxin as a type B2 carcinogen—a probable human 
carcinogen and not “considered a priority pollutant and thus was not subject to regulation on atmospheric 
emissions provided for under the Clean Air Act” (Robin, 2010, p. 52). Cate Jenkins, an EPA chemist who 
had been with the EPA since 1978, had been sent the evidence of fraud by Greenpeace. Once she had 
realized the implications of Monsanto’s epidemiological studies on EPA classification of dioxin, Jenkins 
called for a “scientific audit” (p. 52) of the studies provided by Monsanto (Robin, 2010) 
 Jenkins subsequently became a whistle-blower when Monsanto became aware of her internal 
memorandum “Newly revealed fraud by Monsanto in an epidemiological study used by EPA to assess 
human health effects from dioxins” sent on February 23, 1990 (Robin, 2010; “Monsanto -- more than 30 
years of successful scientific fraud,” 2014) and she was fired by the EPA after Monsanto found out about 
it and its subsequent leak to the media. Of course, after Jenkins gained whistle-blower status, she was 
reinstated and transferred to a position where she could do less damage. Jenkins appealed to the US 
Labor Board and the EPA was ordered to fully reinstate her to her prior position (Robin, 2010). Jenkins is 
one succinct example of a vocal critic being attacked by Monsanto. There are several others that have 
been subject to the company’s wrath that will be described later in this chapter. Jenkins’ story is not 
unique and neither is the history of regulation as demonstrated in the previous chapter.  
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 The question of safety of GMOs and Roundup rests on the idea of suspect regulatory bodies. 
Mesnage et al. (2014) suggests there is a disconnect between the EPA and sound regulation of Roundup 
and it is economic in nature, “this inconsistency between scientific fact and industrial claim may be 
attributed to huge economic interests, which have been found to falsify health risk assessments and delay 
health policy decisions” (p. 7). This chapter demonstrates the delay of health policy decisions in how the 
EPA and TSCA handled PCBs, 2,4,5-T, and dioxin in the Contested History section. 
Moreover, it is not just scientists writing of an asynchrony between science and policy, the public 
at large is as well. Millions Against Monsanto – OrganicConsumers.org has a Facebook page with almost 
700,000 subscribers which regularly circulates images that indict the FDA, EPA, and USDA. March 
against Monsanto also has a Facebook page, with over 800,000 subscribers, which does the same. 
Organic Consumers Association has over 850,000 Facebook subscribers and posts frequent criticisms of 
regulatory agencies in the US. Social media has become a platform of analysis for many scholars as it 
shows public discourse rather well; the social media accounts that deploy populist counter discourses 
against Monsanto can be argued to show national public attitudes. The following images are pulled 




Figure 3 Screenshot of March against Monsanto Facebook image 
 





Figure 5 Screenshot of Organic Consumers Association Facebook image 
 
Figure 6 Screenshot of Millions against Monsanto Facebook Image 
It is interesting to go through the social media accounts of organizations opposed to Monsanto 
and GMOs especially when they are juxtaposed against one another. Monsanto says their products are 
safe because the EPA says they’re safe, but at the very least, critics of GMOs do not trust the EPA to 
make decisions in the public’s best interest. 
Critics of both Monsanto and Federal agencies never fail to suggest “revolving door” politics are 
to blame, this is the idea that Monsanto (and other large corporations) place people in regulatory or 
political positions that give them the ability to legislate in ways that benefit Monsanto. Favorite examples 
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include Linda Fisher and Michael Taylor (Kanthan, 2013; Robin, 2010), as well as Clarence Thomas, the 
Supreme Court Justice (Kanthan, 2013). Linda Fisher was at one point the EPA Administrator and the 
Vice President of Monsanto (Kanthan, 2013; Robin, 2010). Michael Taylor “perfectly embodies the 
revolving door system and, beyond that, the links between Monsanto and US regulatory agencies” 
(Robin, 2010, p. 106), Taylor was in place as the deputy commissioner for policy of the FDA and 
supervised the approval and regulation of recombinant bovine growth hormone and GMOs (Robin, 2010). 
Supreme Court Judge Clarence Thomas has refused to recuse himself from any cases involving 
Monsanto; he also worked for the company in the 1970s as an attorney (Kanthan, 2013; “Monsanto, the 
Government, Monopoly Claims,” 2015). Kanthan (2013) suggests, 
Monsanto has had influence in practically every area of the government: Secretary of Agriculture 
(Ann Veneman—board of directors of a Monsanto subsidiary), Secretary of Defense (Donald 
Rumsfeld made millions of dollars when his company was bought by Monsanto), EPA 
Administrator (William Ruckleshaus—Monsanto’s board of directors), U.S. Trade Representative 
(Mickey Cantor-- Monsanto’s board of directors), FDA Commissioner (Michael Friedman—VP of 
Monsanto), Deputy Director of FDA (Margaret Miller—top scientist at Monsanto), EPA 
Administrator (Linda Fisher—VP at Monsanto), and on and on. (p. 17) 
Authors of the supra counter discourse are often implicitly asking the reader to examine how 
much they know of regulatory bodies before they decide whether or not to trust these agencies’ decisions 
and regulations. As it currently stands, Roundup is perfectly safe according to the EPA (“EPA R.E.D. 
Facts Glyphosate,” 1993) and GMOs are substantially equivalent to their conventional counterparts 
according to the FDA (Bereano, 2014; Kanthan, 2013; Louv, 2013; O’Neil, 2014; Robin, 2010) and GRAS 
(Acosta, 2014). The counter discourse is largely concerned with explaining the science behind GMOs, 
how the seeds are created and their effect on humans, animals, and ecological studies. 
Safety 
Monsanto rarely discusses what its GMO products are designed to do, this represents a gap in 
the dominant discourse that the authors of the counter discourse are willing to fill. The science of GM 
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technology rests on what Roundup and its active ingredient, glyphosate, does to the plant it is sprayed 
upon. Glyphosate was discovered in the late 1960s, and,  
It destroys all forms of vegetation because of the way it works: it is absorbed by the plant through 
the leaves and quickly carried by the sap to the roots and rhizomes. There it inhibits an enzyme 
essential for the synthesizing of aromatic amino acids, which leads to a decrease in the activity of 
chlorophyll as well as of certain enzymes. This causes the necrosis of tissue, leading to the death 
of the plant. (Robin, 2010, p.70) 
The way Robin (2010) describes the science of Roundup is not unlike Monsanto’s explanation, Roundup 
works by, 
disrupting a plant enzyme involved in the production of amino acids that are essential to plant 
growth; […] when the products are applied to green leaves or stems, the active ingredient moves 
throughout the plant so the entire plant dies. A few days after treatment, the plant wilts and 
yellows. Then, as the plant tissue deteriorates, the plant turns brown. At the same time the roots 
or rhizomes are deteriorating so the plant cannot generate. (“History of Monsanto’s Glyphosate 
Herbicides,” 2005) 
This is generally where the similarities end between Monsanto’s discourse of safety and the 
scientific counter discourse of safety end. Then-editor of the Journal of Pesticide Reform Caroline Cox 
(1998) describes the disconnect between industry’s establishment of safety and laboratory studies of the 
substance as “striking” (p. 1) noting that adverse effects include, 
medium-term toxicity (salivary gland lesions), long-term toxicity (inflamed stomach linings), 
genetic damage (in human blood cells), effects on reproduction (reduced sperm counts in rats; 
increased frequency of abnormal sperm in rabbits), and carcinogenicity (increased frequency of 
liver tumors in male rats and thyroid cancer in female rats). (Cox, 1998, p. 1) 
 Cox’s (1998) conclusions regarding risk and glyphosate give insight to a story NPR ran in April of 
2014 about a strange form of kidney disease in Central America affecting young male agricultural workers 
that had taken hold over the last twenty years which was similar to an event that happened in Sri Lanka 
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(Beaubien, 2014). In Sri Lanka, however, Roundup and glyphosate were banned in response to the 
mystery disease (Beaubien, 2014), a solution that has yet to be implemented in Central America—likely 
because Central America is home to Brazil and Argentina, second and third largest provider of GM crops 
(Beaubien, 2014). Cox (1998) notes a similar effect amongst farmers who are exposed to Roundup where 
exposure is associated with “an increased risk of miscarriages, premature birth, and the cancer non-
Hodgkin’s lymphoma” (p. 1).  
Swedish researchers found a link between glyphosate and hairy cell leukemia, a rare form of non-
Hodgkin’s lymphoma (Hardell & Eriksson, 1999; Hardell, Eriksson, & Nordstrom, 2002). Epidemiology 
researchers in the US found a correlation between Roundup and non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma in Canada 
and the US which increased as exposure to the pesticide increased, especially in men exposed for two 
days or more each year to glyphosate (De Roos, Zahm, Cantor, Weisenburger, Holmes, & Burmeister, 
2003; McDuffie, Pahwa, McLaughlin, Spinelli, Fincham, Dosman, Robson, Skinnider, & Choi, 2001).  
Another study found that not only is glyphosate carcinogenic, transmutagenic, and reprotoxic on 
in vivo cells, its Roundup incarnation shows amplified effects which suggests that Roundup is more 
damaging than its active ingredient (Gasnier, Dumont, Benachour, Clair, Chagnon, & Séralini, 2009). 
Mesnage et al. (2014) confirmed the conclusions of Gasnier et al. (2009) when they found Roundup to be 
125 times more toxic than glyphosate alone. Additionally, MIT research scientist Dr. Stephanie Seneff 
charges Roundup with the rise of autism and other environmental effects; Seneff suggests that science 
was wrong when it said that glyphosate does not affect humans in the same way it affects plants—
glyphosate destroys gut bacteria and that in turn destroys immune systems (Jackson, 2014). In summary, 
there is no want for those looking for scientific studies of Roundup and demonstration of harm. 
Monsanto cites yet another literature review performed by John P. Giesy, Stuart Dobson, and 
Keith R. Solomon (2000) to argue Roundup’s persistence in the environment as unlikely as it has a thirty-
two day half-life in soil and it dissipates rapidly in water (“Summary of Ecotoxicological Risk Assessment 
for Roundup Herbicide,” 2005). This statement is in contrast to declarations of persistence by the US 
EPA—in EPA studies glyphosate has been shown to persist in soil for over 100 days in field tests (Cox, 
52 
 
1998). According to its critics, Monsanto has continuously suggested that Roundup is no more dangerous 
than salt (Louv, 2013; Robin, 2010). For example, in France, the Roundup advertising campaign featured 
a dog gnawing on a bone dug up from a Roundup treated yard and a voiceover stating “If, like Rex, you 
hate weeds in your garden, here’s Roundup, the first biodegradable herbicide” (Robin, 2010, p. 69). The 
advertisement ran for three years in France while Monsanto was being sued for false advertisement of 
biodegradability by the French Government after bodies of water around the country were found to be 
heavily contaminated by the herbicide (Robin, 2010).  This understanding of the scientific counter 
discourse of Roundup is pivotal to understanding the GMO discourse and the supra counter discourse.  
Roundup Ready Seeds. In the dominant discourse, many are arguing for the sake of progress 
when arguing for the implementation and acceptances of GMOs. As established previously, what most 
GMO crops are actually designed to do is a gap in the dominant discourse. This gap represents another 
place where the counter discourse must fight to educate the public on the dangers of the herbicide 
because many people are ignorant of what GMOs are commercially designed to do—70% of GMOs are 
Roundup Ready crops (Robin, 2010; The World According to Monsanto, 2008).  
Roundup Ready crops are designed to be able to withstand exposure to large amounts of 
Roundup and that is their sole purpose commercially. In fact, the seeds come with a user agreement that 
requires the farmer to use Monsanto products only (Kanthan, 2013; Krimsky & Gruber, 2014; Louv, 2013; 
Robin, 2010).  
Voices of the populist counter discourse can be found in documentaries such as Food, Inc. 
(2008), GMO OMG (2013), The World According to Monsanto (2008), and Seeds of Death (2012); such 
documentaries suggest that the patenting of seeds is the patenting of life itself, a sentiment that activist 
and scientist Dr. Vandana Shiva agrees with. The problem then becomes how does a corporation own 
the Roundup Ready genes? According to Food Inc. (2008), this was granted by the patent office because 
the genes of Roundup Ready seeds are substantially different from their conventional counterparts. This 
of course is convenient at best, given that the technology is generally recognized as safe (Acosta, 2014) 
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and substantially equivalent (Bereano, 2014; Kanthan, 2013; Louv, 2013; O’Neil, 2014; Robin, 2010) to 
conventional crops. 
 During the 1980s, Monsanto scientists were desperately trying to find an economic niche for their 
gene experiments according to Marie-Monique Robin (2010), and they found their niche in the garbage, 
The search lasted for more than two years, until the day in 1987 when engineers thought of 
rummaging through the garbage in Monsanto’s Luling plant, located 450 miles south of St. Louis. 
At this site on the banks of the Mississippi, Monsanto produced millions of tons of glyphosate 
annually. Decontamination pools were supposed to treat production residues, but some of the 
residues had contaminated nearby land and ponds. Samples were taken to collect thousands of 
microorganisms in order to detect the ones that had naturally survived glyphosate and identify the 
gene that gave them that invaluable resistance. (p. 139) 
Eventually, the gene was successfully inserted into soybeans through the use of a “gene gun” 
(Robin, 2010, p. 140), which is as violent as it sounds, “it works by attaching genetic constructs to 
microscopic gold or tungsten bullets and shooting them into a culture of embryonic cells” (Robin, 2010, p. 
140-141). This successful insertion of genes into soybeans lead to the patenting of the seeds in 1996 by 
Monsanto (“Company History,” 2013) and subsequently more and more seeds have become Roundup 
Ready—Corn, Sugar Beets, Alfalfa, Cotton, Sorghum, and Wheat (“Agricultural Seeds,” 2015). More 
worrisome to Monsanto’s critics is that in the US upwards of 70% of non-organic processed food contains 
GMOs particularly those that have corn or soy ingredients (Food Inc., 2008; GMO OMG, 2013; Kanthan, 
2013; Krimsky & Gruber, 2014; Robin, 2010; Seeds of Death, 2012).  
 The ubiquity of Roundup Ready crops and GMOs is one of the major concerns of the supra 
counter discourse as many question the safety of such. Krimsky and Gruber (2014), editors of the book 
The GMO Deception, articulate the concerns of ubiquity within the counter discourse, “proponents of 
GMOs frequently state that they have been fully studied and proven safe. It’s an often repeated claim, not 
just by industry but by many otherwise independent and free-thinking people. But repeating a claim does 
not make it true” (Gruber, 2014, p. 31-32). Critics of Roundup and Monsanto are not convinced of the 
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safety of Roundup Ready crops. Both scientist and populist critics criticize transgenic seeds and Roundup 
Ready crops beyond the herbicide because of the imprecise nature and archaic understanding of gene 
manipulation in plants,  
The use of genetic engineering, or recombinant DNA technology, to genetically modify crops is 
based on the understanding of genetics and gene regulation that was current twenty to thirty 
years ago […] Given that genes are the blueprints for every structure and function of every part of 
every living thing, by modifying these genes one should be able to modify the structure or function 
of any part of any organism. (Fagen, Antinou, & Robinson, 2014a, p. 28) 
Scientists, according to Fagen et al. (2014a), have no idea what the gene insertion will do to 
genetic expression of the organism in which it is inserted. There is a great deal of unintended 
consequences, when one gene is changed in a plant, it can give rise to a multiplicity of changes (Fagen 
et al., 2014a). Unintended consequences are indeed of great concern to critics of GMOs. Árpád Pusztai, 
the world’s foremost researcher on plant lectins, set out to settle the question of GM crop safety in the UK 
in the late 1990s when he performed a study with rats and GM Snowdrop lectin potatoes (Robin, 2010; 
Anderson, 2014). Ultimately, Pusztai found that the experimental group fed GM lectin potatoes showed 
damage to their intestines while the control groups did not, Puszstai and others suggest this is evidence 
of unintended negative health outcomes of GM technology as lectins on their own are not harmful to 
mammals (Anderson, 2014). Ironically, Pusztai was a proponent of GMO technology and was trying to 
create a scientifically sound protocol so that it could be regulated in the European Union (Smith, 2013).   
Similarly, Gilles-Eric Séralini, a toxicologist and professor at the University of Caen, and 
associates (2014) performed a long-term two year study with rats and Monsanto NK 603 transgenic 
Roundup Ready corn,  
Séralini and his team exposed rats to GM maize and Glyphosate and studied them for two years. 
They found that female rats died at a rate two to three times greater than controls. Female rats 
developed large mammary tumors more often and earlier in life than the control groups. In treated 
male rats, liver congestion and necrosis were observed 2.5 to 5.5 more frequently than controls; 
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severe kidney disease was found to be 1.3 to 2.3 times greater with large palpable tumors 
occurring four times more than controls. (Krimsky, Séralini, Mesnage, & Bernay, 2014, p. 47-48) 
Séralini et al. (2014) was addressing the fact that Industry toxicity trials on Roundup Ready crops are only 
three months. Critics that charge Monsanto with manipulating data by performing very short (three month) 
toxicity trials and using older rats (Krimsky et al., 2014; Seeds of Death, 2012; Séralini et al., 2014; Smith, 
2013; Newman, 2014) Often critics charge regulatory agencies with relying on a summary of these short 
trials instead of the raw data before implementing regulation of Roundup Ready crops and other GMOs 
(Kanthan, 2013; Louv, 2013; Robin, 2010).  
Creating Heroes. The dominant discourse deployed by Monsanto suggests there is indeed 
scientific consensus that Monsanto’s agricultural assemblage of Roundup and Roundup Ready crops are 
safe. The populist counter discourse deployed by activists suggests that the scientific consensus is not 
out of agreement but rather because scientists are afraid that voicing their concerns will lead to the 
eventual destruction of their reputation (Robin, 2010; Smith 2013). The common examples of this 
phenomenon can be seen in the fallout from both Pusztai’s study and Séralini’s studies on GMO 
technology. Jon Entine of Forbes and the Genetic Literacy Project (a pro-biotechnology group) writes 
about the “Séralini Affair” (Entine, 2014b) with a heavy hand, primarily citing pro-GMO/anti-activist 
sources in the bylines. Gilles-Éric Séralini had studied Roundup and GMOs for quite some time before he 
had provoked the wrath of Monsanto (Krimsky et al., 2014). There are accusations that several of 
Séralini’s harshest critics had “undisclosed financial relationships with Monsanto” (Fugh-Berman & 
Sherman, 2014) and the entire process by which the article was retracted “reek[ed] of industry pressure” 
(Fugh-Berman & Sherman, 2014; Robinson, 2013).  
Árpád Pusztai’s story is similar; Pusztai appeared on television on August 10th, 1998, shortly after 
the conclusion of his study on GM potatoes. The interviewer asked Pusztai if he would eat transgenic 
potatoes, Pusztai replied “No. And as a scientist actively working in the field, I find it’s very unfair to use 
our fellow citizens as guinea pigs” (Robin, 2010, p. 181). The Rowett Institute, the best European nutrition 
laboratory, where Pusztai worked seemed nonplussed at first, according to Robin (2010) Pusztai was 
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praised by the Rowett Institute for being so upfront. The institute fired Pusztai and put him under a gag 
order regarding his study and raw data just two days later. Shortly afterward, a disinformation campaign 
began wherein another Rowett Institute scientist claimed that Pusztai had confused the Snowdrop lectin 
with concanavalin A lectin—a lectin known to be toxic (Robin, 2010). The controversy eventually lead to a 
hearing with the House of Commons Science and Technology committee, Pusztai was able to access his 
data again and send it to twenty colleagues he had worked with previously, who then verified its validity. 
The whole affair seems to have sparked the general distrust of GMOs in Europe as the affair was front 
page news on many EU newspapers (Robin, 2010). There are whispers that link all this controversy to 
the Tony Blair administration and to Monsanto itself (Smith, 2013). In spite of all the unrest, Pusztai did go 
on to publish the study’s results in the prestigious Lancet. However, according to Jeffrey Smith (2013), 
despite Pusztai’s work, there is still no scientifically sound protocol for determining harm of GMOs in the 
EU.  
In the US, according to the populist counter discourse, Monsanto and other biotechnology 
companies hold the keys to scientific inquiry regarding the safety of GMOs (Louv, 2013; Robin, 2010; 
Smith, 2013). First, Monsanto will not grant access to the seeds or even the gene of which they would like 
to study without adding in the stipulation that the study may not be published without their express 
authorization—and the company ultimately owns the data (Robin, 2010; Anderson, 2014). Second, more 
often than not, there is very little funding in the US to study the effects of GMOs in independent studies—
Pusztai was originally working through a grant that had intended to prove that GMOs are safe (Smith, 
2013). In many respects, despite the controversy galvanizing to Monsanto’s critics, the subsequent 
silencing is far more insidious than the initial attacks. 
Stories of industry attacks and other dubious behaviors by Monsanto, its PR specialists, and 
lawyers are seen as galvanizing for the supra counter discourse. This thesis argues that instead of 
quieting the activists and scientists who speak out against the company and its products, attacks such as 
those on Séralini and Pusztai are absorbed and reproduced within the supra counter discourse because it 
stands in contrast the benevolent image that Monsanto has cultivated for itself. Monsanto’s philanthropic 
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image is one similar to a St. Nick bringing food to the world, however, Monsanto’s answer to the necessity 
of GM technology is food scarcity—Robb Fraley of Monsanto fame says there will be nine billion people 
to feed by 2050 (Monsanto Company, 2013). In the face of scientific uncertainty, criticism, and ubiquity 
Monsanto must answer the question of necessity and how it benefits the consumer: simply put Monsanto 
will feed the world and end food-scarcity. The following section outlines how Monsanto’s critics and 
authors of the supra counter discourse dismantle and address the claims of Monsanto’s discourse. 
Rearticulating Necessity 
 In an interview with Samuel Anderson (2014) of GeneWatch Pusztai is quoted as saying of 
GMOs “We have to consider this, if it gives any advantage to the consumer. The consumers are carrying 
all of the risks but they aren’t getting any of the benefits. That’s one of the reasons why the biotech 
companies are now touting this idea, ‘the world is short of food, we’re going to provide it.’” (p. 46). The 
idea of GMO necessity is purported by Monsanto but also exacerbated by concerns of food scarcity in 
general. There are food deserts in the US and extreme droughts in other countries that sound terrifying in 
the Western World, rhetoric that promises to solve these crises is persuasive and effective. This section 
looks at how the counter discourse argues against the ideas of GMOs being the only way to ensure fewer 
people will go to bed hungry. 
 On a surface level, the assertion that GMOs are the best or only way to feed the world would 
imply the entire world should indeed begin using GM technology. The issues of food scarcity have very 
little to do with the amount of food produced, Raj Patel (2012) author of Stuffed and Starved argues that 
food insecurity amongst the poor is very much a social and economic problem rather than a production 
problem. This sentiment echoes throughout the populist counter discourse (Bittman, 2013; Fagen, 
Antoniou, & Robinson, 2014b; Gimenez, 2012; Woodward, 2014). As of this writing, many estimate the 
world has more than enough food being produced to feed as many as fourteen billion (Woodward, 
2014)—five billion more than Monsanto is suggesting the need to ramp up production for. Patel (2012) 
suggests that “feeding the world” is a concern of Westerners and the argument of such is designed to 
sway Westerners towards accepting GM technologies. Grassroots campaigns echo the sentiment, the 
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Facebook page of Millions Against Monsanto by OrganicConsumers.org features images that promotes 
and proselytizes this specific claim through social media—a powerful tool in grass-roots advocacy. 
 
 
Figure 7 Screenshot of Millions Against Monsanto Facebook image 





Figure 8 Screenshot of Millions against Monsanto Facebook image 
In addition to already being able to feed the world, potentially twice over (Woodward, 2014), many within 
the populist counter discourse are calling for the recognition of organic farming’s ability to produce nearly 
as much or as much food as GM technology and potentially heal the Earth.  
 




Figure 10 Screenshot of Organic Consumers Association Facebook image 
 Often there are hyperlinks to articles that refute the mainstays of the dominant discourse such as 
GMOs are perfectly safe and the best way to feed the world. The populist counter discourse dispels these 
“myths” in the same way it deals with the dominant discourse in general, in a head-on direct refutation of 
claims as seen in Christina Sarich’s (2014) online article titled “8 Proofs We Don’t Need GMOs to Feed 
the World,” which has been re-blogged several times over online. According to Sarich (2014), one organic 
rooftop garden can feed 9000 people if done correctly; small organic farms are successful even in big 
cities; even some airports (i.e., La Guardia Airport) are choosing to serve sustainable non-GM food to 
their patrons; the United Nations noted that organic agriculture may be exactly what is needed to feed the 
world; low-tech sustainable agriculture is proving to increase yields on poor farms by upwards of 70%; 
urban gardens do not even need dirt in some cases (Aquaponics) to be sustainable; several US states 
have taken action moving toward a more sustainable model of agriculture; and finally organic home 
gardeners are seeing increased yields. Sarich’s (2014) writing is a playful interaction with the dominant 
discourse, but it is certainly not unique. There are hundreds of websites and webpages that have similar 
write-ups regarding Monsanto’s claim of Biotech being necessary to feeding the world.  
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 Refuting Monsanto’s Claim of Saving the Farmer. According to an interview with Dr. Vandana 
Shiva conducted by Takeaway host John Hockenberry (2014), Roundup Ready crop yields have 
dwindled over the years and lead the way for super weeds resistant to Roundup to take hold in Roundup 
Ready fields. Smith (2013) and Robin (2010) have written about the rise in Roundup costs associated 
with Roundup Ready fields over time in both the US and in South America. If the Roundup costs are 
eventually higher for those most impacted by food scarcity, how do Roundup Ready crops and GMOs 
offer a solution that is supposed to feed the world? This is a question asked by the authors of the supra 
counter discourse not only in the refutation of Monsanto’s claims but also of the agribusiness model in 
general. The most common answer is that Roundup Ready crops do so by becoming a symbiotic 
relationship between Monsanto and the farmer that increasingly benefits the farmer (Robin, 2010).  
 In the US, patent laws prevent a great deal of use for farmers. As discussed earlier, Monsanto 
limits the amount of scientific inquiry that can be done on its patented genes. That same patent dictates 
how farmers can use that seed, including limiting one’s ability to share with researchers per the 
Technology User Agreement (Bereano & Phillipson, 2014). The Technology User Agreement requires the 
end-user (the farmer) to not save seed, to use Monsanto products (namely Roundup), and to allow 
Monsanto to inspect their crops to verify compliance (Bereano & Phillipson, 2014). Patent infringement 
has become a large part of the counter discourse. Percy Schmeiser, the Saskatchewan canola farmer 
who was sued by Monsanto for patent infringement, has become the poster-boy for the populist counter 
discourse. Percy Schmeiser is featured in the documentary Seeds of Death (2012), as well as in Food 
Inc. (2008). 
 Schmeiser has become a folk hero within the supra counter discourse. The song of his triumph 
against Monsanto began in 1997 when he found Roundup tolerant soybean plants on his land, likely due 
to cross-pollination from neighboring fields (“Percy Schmeiser,” 2015; Robin, 2010). According to 
Monsanto’s website, Schmeiser then allegedly saved the Roundup tolerant seeds and replanted them in 
1998 (“Percy Schmeiser,” 2015); it was then that Monsanto asked Schmeiser to pay Technology Use fees 
to the company for using their genes without a license (“Percy Schmeiser,” 2015). Schmeiser refused to 
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pay the licensing fees because he did not want the tolerant plants in his fields (Robin, 2010; Makin, 
2004). The Supreme Court of Canada ruled in favor of Monsanto; Schmeiser had indeed violated patent 
licenses by saving seed and replanting (intentionally according to Monsanto) the tolerant plants (“Percy 
Schmeiser,” 2015). According to science policy analyst at the Center for Food Safety Bill Freese (2014), 
Monsanto has pursued thousands of farmers for allegedly saving and replanting its patented 
Roundup Ready soybean seeds. An analysis by Center for Food Safety has documented court-
imposed payments of more than $21 million from farmers to Monsanto for alleged patent 
infringement. (p. 115)  
 Schmeiser is seen as a hero because he stood up to the agribusiness giant by refusing to pay the 
technology fees on plants he did not want (Robin, 2010). In addition to appearing in various 
documentaries chronicling the dubious nature of GMOs, Percy Schmeiser has been the subject of his 
very own film David v. Monsanto which came out in 2009. According to the populist counter discourse, 
the issue of GM technology and patents comes down to a battle between public and private control of 
food systems (Bereano & Phillipson, 2014). The patenting of seeds ultimately means control of the seeds 
and any food that yields from it. Perhaps in the US, this is not necessarily an alarm-ringing issue outside 
the farming community, but in the rest of the world where small-holding subsistence farming is a way of 
life it is a huge problem. Several poor and hungry nations have refused food aid on the basis of rejecting 
the patenting and control of the seeds. Zambia and Zimbabwe have refused US food aid on the basis that 
some of it may be GM maize (corn) (Mpofu, 2010). Haiti refused Monsanto donated seeds in 2010, 
promising to burn any that came into the country on the basis that one cannot patent life (GMO OMG, 
2014; Bell, 2010).  
 The supra counter discourse and the dominant discourse agree that between population growth 
and climate change there is a need to find a way to increase yields through the already cultivated land. 
The populist counter discourse discusses alternative agricultural visions such as agroecology and 




Alternative Agricultural Visions 
 Thus far, throughout this thesis, biotechnology has been used synonymously with GM food and 
more specifically Roundup Ready seeds. There are many safe and effective forms of beneficial 
biotechnologies that utilize genetics, one such technology which has great application potential in food 
systems is Marker Assisted Tracking or Selection (Fagen et al., 2014b; Folger, 2014). It differs from gene 
insertion technologies such as Roundup Ready seeds in that it marks certain known genes and then 
tracks them in breeding trials to “create crop varieties that deliver high quality, high yields, and resistance 
to pests and stress” (Fagen et al., 2014b). This form of biotechnology is already being utilized by the 
International Rice Research Institute in the successful breeding of a flood-tolerant rice variety and as a 
result they are attempting to breed a drought tolerant rice variety (Folger, 2014). Fagen et al. (2014b) 
assert that marker assisted selection is different from GM crops and modern agriculture because “these 
methods are adaptable and therefore can be made compatible with the geography, climate, and culture 
where they’re implemented” (p. 66). Marker assisted tracking finds itself in the supra counter discourse as 
a reprieve from the constant demonization of GM technology and Monsanto. However, the concept of 
working synergistically with the land finds itself in the discourse of agroecology. 
 Agroecology and Local Food Movements. Agroecology is the interdisciplinary scientific 
discipline that utilizes “ecological theory to study, design, manage and evaluate agricultural systems that 
are productive but also resource conserving” (“Agroecology in Action,” 2000). Agroecology is reflexive 
and reflective of itself as it approaches agriculture with consideration not only for the land but also the 
people working the land. Agroecology is similar to what Dr. Vandana Shiva teaches regarding 
biodiversity, according to Greenpeace, Shiva was in Tanzania earlier in 2014 to champion the 
implementation of agroecology. Greenpeace quotes Shiva in regards to agroecology, “Globalized 
industrialized food is not cheap: it is too costly for the Earth, for the farmers, for our health. The Earth can 
no longer carry the burden of groundwater mining, pesticide pollution, disappearance of species and 
destabilization of the climate. Farmers can no longer carry the burden of debt, which is inevitable in 
industrial farming with its high costs of production. It is incapable of producing safe, culturally appropriate, 
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tasty, quality food” (Salaam, 2014). Agroecology seems to equate to small-subsistence farming, which 
reportedly provides 70% of the world’s food (“Agroecology in Action,” 2000; Salaam, 2014). The 
monocultures of GMOs and Roundup Ready crops do not fit in the discourse of agroecology, but it is 
important to note that even large-scale commercial organic farming will not fit either. Agroecology is akin 
to the local food movement, a movement in the US that is embodied by farmers markets and small family 
farms. 
 Polyface Farm in Swoope, VA run by Joel Salatin has become the face of the American 
agroecology movement. Salatin has been featured in Michael Pollan’s (2007) Omnivore’s Dilemma as the 
alternative vision to concentrated animal feeding organizations (CAFO—where animals are raised for 
slaughter on a grand scale). Food Inc. (2008) featured Salatin discussing the politics of small-scale 
farming in the US while slaughtering and processing chicken. Salatin suggests that synergistic agricultural 
systems are the only way to continue to feed the world; he asserts the agri-industrial complex will destroy 
all our arable land. Polyface Farm boasts a closed-system of ecology: the cows, chickens, and pigs work 
together to keep the farm going and prevent outside inputs such as Roundup or Atrazine (Pollan, 2007). 
Salatin is quoted in a MotherEarthNews interview as saying of the recent organic movement: “intuitively, 
people understand that the historical use of the word “organic” identified an idea and a paradigm rather 
than a visceral list of dos and don’ts” (Phelps, 2008). The supra counter discourse and alternative 
agricultural visions often assert the foods their parents’ generation was organic simply because there was 
no option to grow food with questionable pesticides, fertilizers, and GMO seeds.  
Conclusion 
 This chapter focused primarily on scientific and populist counter discourses that collectively 
constitute the supra counter discourse of the assemblage of Roundup and Roundup Ready crops in the 
US. This is not to suggest that other countries do not have their own dominant or counter discourse of 
GMOs, but rather it was outside the scope of this chapter. Sometimes the discourses in other countries 
are absorbed into the discourse in the US, as seen in the discussion of Haiti refusing Monsanto’s donated 
seed in 2010, to demonstrate the questionable nature of GMOs in the US. Third World countries do not 
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want GMO foodstuffs while their people are starving and yet citizens in one of the most developed 
country in the world are eating GMO foodstuffs.  
 Additionally, the supra counter discourse focuses on dismantling the dominant discourse 
deployed by Monsanto, first by exposing a buried history that suggests Monsanto has asserted the safety 
of its products in the name of profits despite knowing their products are hazardous. The contested history 
chronicled by Monique-Marie Robin (2010) and Jason Louv (2013) puts long forgotten disasters that 
Monsanto is responsible for in the forefront of the supra counter discourse. PCBs in Anniston, Alabama, 
Dioxin in Times Beach, Agent Orange contamination in US Vietnam Vets all remind the audience that 
Monsanto has betrayed the American public before, they have put profits above people time and time 
again and they are likely to do so in the future. There are federal agencies like the EPA, FDA, and USDA 
that are put in place to stop companies like Monsanto from harming the public with their products, but the 
supra counter discourse indicts federal agencies as well. Federal agencies have declared Roundup and 
Roundup Ready crops safe in spite of a lack of scientific consensus, according to the supra counter 
discourse, these agencies must at least be suspect.  
 The supra counter discourse utilizes the independent research that links Roundup herbicides to 
negative health and ecological outcomes. The supra counter discourse further resists Monsanto’s 
dominant discourse by reviewing the scientific research that questions the safety of Roundup Ready 
crops and other GMOs. The scientists associated with research that resists Monsanto’s dominant framing 
of its assemblage often become heroes in the supra counter discourse, in addition to experts. Scientists 
who have experienced negative professional outcomes after publishing their research, such as Gilles-Eric 
Séralini, become part of the discourse that challenges Monsanto’s cultivated image of benevolence. 
Similarly, Percy Schmeiser’s struggle with Monsanto was taken up by the supra counter discourse to 
question Monsanto’s image.  
 Monsanto’s dominant discourse asserts that the agricultural assemblage of Roundup and 
Roundup Ready seeds is necessary to feeding the nine billion people expected to inhabit the earth in 
2050. The supra counter discourse resists Monsanto’s assertion and suggests that current agricultural 
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production is currently overproducing food. The supra counter discourse suggests food insecurity is a 
matter of social economic status and access to food. 
 There are no laws in the US to regulate GM crops because they’re generally regarded as safe 
(GRAS), so in addition to undermining the federal agencies interest in public safety, the supra counter 
discourse has to deconstruct the dominant discourse of safety and create its own. The construction of 
safety in the supra counter discourse begins by reevaluating whether or not Roundup is safe and then 
ends by questioning the extension of safety Roundup Ready crops received from Roundup’s established 
discourse of safety. Roundup is not safe according to the counter discourse, it does not simply reduce to 
salt after 24 hours (an assertion made by Monsanto) but rather persists in its environment and it has been 
linked with several devastating cancers. Roundup Ready crops are designed to withstand Roundup. The 




INTERACTION OF THE DISCOURSES 
In March of 2013, President Obama signed House Resolution (HR) 933 into law. HR 933 is 
officially known as the “Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act,” as it was a funding bill 
designed to prevent government shutdown. HR 933 also became colloquially known as “The Monsanto 
Protection Act.” In its final iteration, sec 735 “The Farmer Assurance Provision” of HR 933 was inserted by 
Senator Blunt which prevented federal courts from barring the USDA regulating the planting of GMOs in 
the event that evidence was discovered showing potential harm (Horrigan, 2013; Louv, 2013; Sheets, 
2013a). Senator Roy Blunt reportedly received campaign donations from Monsanto totaling $108,000 
since 2010, and apparently it took the senator some time to admit he was responsible (Horrigan, 2013). 
More disconcerting than the provision itself, many members of Congress reportedly had no idea that the 
provision had been added to what was supposed to be a budget bill (Sheets, 2013a),  
The passing of HR 933—specifically sec 735—sparked serious outrage in the public, within the 
few days of its passing the House of Representatives and the Senate but before it was signed into law by 
the President, more than 250,000 signatures had been collected and sent to the White House by activist 
group Food Democracy Now demanding the law be vetoed to prevent “The Monsanto Protection Act” 
from also being passed (Lennard, 2013; Sheets, 2013b). In addition to the signatures protesting the act, 
there were protests in front of the White House, first calling the President to veto the bill and then 
condemning him because he failed to do so (Sheets, 2013b). Apparently, the passing of The Monsanto 
Protection Act galvanized more protests as it was linked to March Against Monsanto protests later in 
2013 (Schirtzinger, 2014). 
April of 2014 marked more congressional movement in regards to GMOs, Republican 
congressman Mike Pompeo introduced a bill, the Safe and Accurate Food Labeling Act,” that would block 
individual states from requiring labeling on foods containing GMOs (Gillam 2014a), it has become known 
as “The Dark Act” among activists. Carey Gillam (2014a), journalist for Reuters, quotes the congressman 
apropos the bill “we’ve got a number of states that are attempting to put together a patchwork quilt of food 
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labeling requirements with respect to genetic modification of foods,” Pompeo suggests that this does 
nothing but confuse and scare the consumer. The Safe and Accurate Food Labeling Act seeks to address 
this uncertainty (Gillam, 2014a).  
The Monsanto Protection Act expired in September of 2013 (Lutey, 2013). The Dark Act has not 
gained any legislative ground since its introduction in 2014 (“H.R.4432 - Safe and Accurate Food Labeling 
Act of 2014,” 2014). Section 735 of HR 933 and The Dark Act showcase backdoor dealings in the 
legislature that have had very little public input—there was no fight over public opinion. State ballot 
measures differ in that as they are wholly decided by individual votes. In 2012, California’s ballot measure 
that would require GMO labels on food was defeated and in 2013 the same happened in Washington, 
journalist Carey Gillam (2014b) notes that it was a close race in both states. The protests surrounding HR 
933 and numerous state ballot measures paint a picture of urgency in the United States surrounding 
GMOs, people are at the very least concerned about what they are eating as evidenced by outrage at 
Congress for what amount to pro-business house resolutions. The interesting thing in the dominant 
discourse deployed by Monsanto, though is there is very little in the way of support for legislative attempts 
that don’t involve the public (i.e., state ballot measures). Most the media stories about HR 933 are after 
the fact, and subsequently what is available is a negative reaction to the news of subversive legislation.  
The year 2014 was an extremely busy year for Monsanto and GMOs in general, twenty-seven 
states reportedly were working on mandating labels for GMO in food and 66 active bills and ballot 
initiatives in the works (Gillam, 2014b). Of those in the works, this chapter will focus on Colorado and 
Oregon’s efforts to label genetically engineered ingredients. On November 4th, 2014 Colorado and 
Oregon residents voted on GM labeling initiatives. Prior to the vote, it seemed that everyone had an 
opinion even Steamboat Today took a position on the Colorado proposition that would require GMO 
labeling in the state. The GMO labeling efforts in 2014 represent a unique case study in which to analyze 
the dominant discourse of GMOs and the dominant counter-discourse. In the months leading up to the 
November 4th, 2014 election, Monsanto appeared to be quiet while many media outlets were discussing 
the topic of mandatory GMO labeling. The first part of this chapter focuses on explaining the initiatives, 
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then will focus on the discourse of Monsanto and opponents of labeling, and finally on proponents of 
labeling.  
State Measures. The GMO labeling ballot measure Colorado was Proposition 105. Prop 105 
would have established a separate labeling system for packaged foods that contain GMO ingredients 
(Runyan, 2014a; Runyan, 2014b). The labeling initiative in Colorado would have only applied to foods 
that currently have nutrition labels, primarily processed foods, and not to meat, dairy, alcohol, or food 
from restaurants (Estabrook, 2014), 
The GMO labeling ballot measure in Oregon was Proposition 92; similar to Colorado, Oregon’s 
GMO label would require a declaration of GMO ingredients on packaged foods (Runyan, 2014a; Runyan, 
2014b). Oregon’s measure would have only applied to raw and packaged foods (“Oregon GMO Labeling 
measures draws big bucks from supporters, opponents,” 2014).    
 Opponents argue that labeling packaged foods for GMO ingredients would be burdensome to 
Colorado and Oregon farmers and food producers (Runyan, 2014a; Runyan, 2014b). However, 
proponents of labeling disagree; Oregon‘s Right to Know campaign and Colorado’s Right to Know 
campaign mirror each other in contesting that notion. According to the respective websites for the 
initiatives, would require no additional action from the farmers and only impose labeling on the companies 
producing the processed food (“Faqs & Resources,” 2014; “Why Label GMO Foods,” 2014). Similar 
measures have been brought forward in Washington, California, Connecticut, Vermont, and Maine (Law, 
2014; Chappell, 2014). GMO labeling initiatives have passed in Vermont, Connecticut, and Maine, but 
Connecticut and Maine have conditions to be met before the labeling is enacted, primarily that the 
surrounding states have to also enact similar measures (Chappell, 2014). According to the Library of 
Congress, 90% of people polled would like to know if they’re eating GMOs with their food (Acosta, 2014). 
A similar poll in Colorado prior to the November ballot reported that over 50% of CO respondents wanted 
GMO labels and would vote Yes on 105 (Sexton, 2014). In Colorado alone, 171,000 (145% of the 
signatures needed to put the initiative on the ballot) people wanted a genetic engineering label initiative 
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on the ballot as they signed the initial petitions (Cooper, 2014). This is interesting because it seems that 
unfettered and given a choice, people want to know if they are eating GMOs. 
In Colorado, a dissenter of proposition 105 proposed it could cost millions of dollars to implement, 
much more than the estimate proposed by the Colorado Legislative Council of $113,000. The anonymous 
author of a Steamboat Today article goes on to suggest that labeling GM foods would devalue foods by 
implying they were inferior to deserve such a label (“Our view: Proposition 105 is costly and confusing,” 
2014). Right to Know Colorado and Right to Know Oregon both cite the same studies on their websites 
that GMO labels would cost no more than $2.30 per person annually; that’s less than a penny a day 
(Chokshi, 2014).  
The USDA and American Medical Association consider GMOs completely safe, and 75% of 
processed foods in America are made with genetically engineered ingredients. People who want to avoid 
GMOs should continue to buy organic or GMO-free labeled foods; in the anonymous author’s opinion, an 
additional label is unnecessary (“Our view: Proposition 105 is costly and confusing,” 2014). A sentiment 
echoed in Oregon by biotech companies including Monsanto (Gillam, 2014b). Anti-labeling monies came 
from seed, food, and biotech companies (Gillam, 2014b) with 4.7 million dollars coming from Monsanto 
alone in Colorado as of October 14, 2014 (Knowles, 2014).  
In Oregon, Monsanto contributed 5.9 million dollars to the No on 92 campaign (“Oregon 
Mandatory Labeling of GMOs Initiative, Measure 92,” 2014). In both states, the opponents of the ballot 
measures outspent proponents by a great deal—20.8 million dollars were spent to oppose the initiative in 
Oregon while only 11.2 million in donations supported it (“Oregon Mandatory Labeling of GMOs Initiative, 
Measure 92,” 2014), and in Colorado just over 700 thousand dollars supported Yes on 105 campaign and 
12.6 million dollars were against it (“Colorado Mandatory Labeling of GMOs Initiative, Proposition 105,” 
2014).  
The Deployments of the Anti-Labeling Discourse 
Many news stories attempted to present both sides by citing citizens who want labels and farmers 
claiming they would be affected by labeling initiatives in Colorado and Oregon. For example, a farmer in 
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Colorado claims he grows GMO sugar beets; when the beets are processed into sugar, the sugar is 
genetically identical to regular and even organic sugar (Runyan, 2014c). He asks how it is fair he now has 
to label his GMO-but-not-really-GMO sugar when the final product should bear no resemblance to its 
GMO primary ingredient (Runyan, 2014c). Other articles cite farmers claiming that they will have to 
purchase more farming equipment to maintain segregation if they grow both conventional and GMO crops 
if the ballot measures go through (Runyan, 2014c). Ultimately, journalists asserted that these extra costs 
will be passed along to the consumer and indeed raise annual grocery costs (Stiles, 2014). Some 
advertisements in Oregon claim that the costs to farmers will be in the millions of dollars if the initiative 
passes (Mahoney, 2014). In fact, one journalist asserts that the annual cost to Oregon residents would be 
upwards of $500 for a family of four (Stiles, 2014). These kinds of claims present a red herring fallacy as 
the ballot measures in both states would only require the labeling of GMO ingredients, not the 
segregation of the ingredients, and suggesting otherwise is meant to divert attention from the real issues.  
Monsanto is opposed to GM food labels primarily because “in the absence of any demonstrated 
risks” (“Labeling Food and Ingredients Developed from GM Seed,” 2013), a label suggests that GM 
foodstuffs are inferior to their conventional counterparts (“Labeling Food and Ingredients Developed from 
GM Seed,” 2013). The FDA has declared GM crops to be GRAS and not substantially different from 
conventional produce, and Monsanto agrees with the FDA about the safety of GM technology.  
Monsanto states it is committed to public health and safety, “and the safety of biotech crops is 
well-established. [Monsanto] agree[s] with the conclusions of multiple health societies, hundreds of 
independent scientific experts and dozens of governments around the world who have determined that 
food ingredients and products made from biotech crops are as safe as their conventional counterparts” 
(“Labeling Food and Ingredients Developed from GM Seed,” 2013). The Roundup Ready system is a 
“reduced tillage” (“Agronomic Practices,” 2015) system. According to its proponents, it helps reduce 
topsoil loss by precluding the farmer from tilling the land before planting for the system, he can simply 
spray Roundup herbicides to kill weeds and prep soil before planting for the season, and then again 
periodically to keep weeds from taking over fields (“Agronomic Practices,” 2015). Certainly, many non-
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organic farmers are utilizing GM seeds because of this labor-saving and resource-saving technology, 
roughly 90% of all processed food contain GMOs (Moritz, 2014). In the absence of demonstrated risk of 
harm and in the face of ubiquity, it makes sense that labels are seen unnecessary in the world of 
biotechnology.  
The attempt to examine the No on 105 and No on 92 political ads has been only partially 
executed as many of the advertisements and other texts (e.g., websites) have been removed and 
dismantled from public view. Neither the No on 105 Coalition in Colorado or the No on 92 Coalition in 
Oregon even have a proper website as of this writing, which is odd as it was a widely funded campaign—
$33.4 million dollars between Colorado and Oregon donors. Some webpages of each coalitions’ sites 
were located through Google’s cache, which allowed the researcher to put together pieces of the 
dominant discourse. Another source in piecing together the dominant discourse and anti-labeling 
discourse has been each coalition’s short-lived Twitter accounts.  
There are three frequently used themes by both coalitions, prop 105 and 92 will be costly to small 
business and families, will be misleading to consumers, and are of unscientific merit. Less prominent 
themes include National regulations would be more effective and would ease the burden on Coloradan 
and Oregonian farmers, and experts former Agriculture Commissioner of Colorado Don Ament and 
nutrition educator Amber Clay. It cannot be confirmed that Don Ament and Amber Clay were part of the 
political advertisements as a direct viewing of the political advertisements was not available, however the 
rebuttals available on the Right to Know Colorado website suggest both individuals were.  
 The Twitter accounts for the No on 105 and 92 coalitions are still live and available, but there are 
only 21 and 47 followers respectively as of this writing; it is difficult to unequivocally assert that the Twitter 
accounts are modes of deployment for the dominant discourse. Unfortunately, it is one of the only sites of 
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Figure 11 Screenshot of No on 92 
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Figure 14 Screenshot of No on 105 
 
Figure 15 Screenshot of No on 105 
 




Figure 17 Screenshot of No on 105 
 
Figure 18 Screenshot of No on 105 
 
Figure 19 Screenshot of No on 105 
What is especially interesting given that the majority of money donated to the No on 105 and No 




Figure 20 Screenshot of No on 105 
 
Figure 21 Screenshot of No on 92 
 





 Experts were created through Don Ament and Amber Clay in Colorado. Don Ament was the 
Agriculture Commissioner for a number of years, and Amber Clay is a nutrition educator and a mom. 
Amber represents the educated consumer, she is the expert that anyone can see themselves reflected in, 
the everyday “hero” trying to do the best for her family is not only unconcerned about GMOs, but 
completely against labeling them. Don Ament is the quintessential farmer, the man who can go on to 
represent all farmers. These experts are recreated in the images of those experts in the dominant 
discourse deployed by Monsanto. This is not a scientific debate so no scientists are required or 
necessary; it’s about saving the family and the consumer from costly measures—Monsanto is the savior 
to farmers in its own estimation. The next section is an account of the political advertisements on the 
other side of the debate, the proponents of labeling. 
The Deployments of the Pro-Labeling Discourse 
Alternatively, the general argument of proponents of labeling initiatives is that if GMO ingredients 
pose no risks then why not label them? Proponents are not suggesting (at least on a surface level) that 
GMOs are harmful but rather they would like to know if they’re eating them (Sexton, 2014). Of course, 
opponents including Monsanto suggest that those who are unknowledgeable about food and nutrition 
may see the label as a mark of inferiority or a health warning (“Labeling Food and Ingredients Developed 
from GM Seed,” 2013; Sexton, 2014). To mitigate this campaign of transparency by proponents of 
labeling, Monsanto (and many others including the Grocery Manufacturers Association) contributed a 
considerable sum of campaign money.  
Figure 23 Screenshot of No on 92 
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Much like how the dominant counter-discourse seems to absorb attacks and appropriate them for 
their own use, the proponents of GMO labeling in Oregon and Colorado use the dollar amount being 
contributed by Monsanto to their opponents as evidence of something dubious at best and sinister at 
worst—and not to mention solicit more donations (Ruiz, 2014). Larry Cooper, campaign co-chair of Right 
to Know Colorado wrote in an opinion piece for the Denver Post, 
Over the last two years, the world's largest chemical and biotech seed companies and America's 
giant food manufacturers have spent nearly $70 million to defeat GMO labeling initiatives in 
California and Washington. In just three weeks, those opposed to Proposition 105 raised $1.4 
million, dwarfing the $22,000 raised by Right to Know Colorado. While these spending differences 
are staggering, Right to Know Colorado's statewide grassroots support will continue to fight for 
greater transparency in our food system through this GMO labeling initiative despite the well-
funded corporate opposition. (Cooper, 2014)  
The grassroots campaigns like Right to Know Colorado and Right to Know Oregon write as though it is a 
David and Goliath story, which is not necessarily unfounded. It pits the narrative of big business standing 
up for the little guy (i.e., the farmers, food processors, and consumers) against itself—these ballot 
initiatives have been put together by the little guys (i.e., grassroots campaigns).  
 The proponents of prop 105 and 92 are spending a lot of time refuting the claims of their 
opponents as well, much like the dominant counter-discourse does in Chapter Three. Also bear in mind 
how the dominant discourse of safety Monsanto purports from Chapter Two, and you’ll see the opponents 
doing the same by suggesting that GMOs are safe, even if they’re designed specifically to withstand a 
great deal of pesticide, the pesticide itself is safe, so the GMO is safe. The Yes on 92 campaign refutes 
that claim in a political advertisement featuring the EPA scientist first tasked with studying GMOs in the 
1990s, Dr. Ray Siedler PhD, speaking about the differences between conventional corn and Roundup 
Ready corn. In the advertisement, he has a handful of yellow corn kernels and a clear bag of blue corn 
kernels. He says of the blue corn, “these are engineered to withstand huge doses of pesticides. That blue 
coating is five toxic chemicals that end up in our food. The chemical companies making these seeds 
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made Agent Orange and claimed it was safe, too” (Oregon Right to Know, 2014a). Siedler then asks the 
viewer if they would like to know which one they’re eating, then they must vote “Yes” on 92. This 
advertisement is powerful, it creates ethos around the scientist, Dr. Ray Siedler PhD, Former Senior 
Scientist, Environmental Protection Agency. Dr. Ray Siedler PhD is redundant but it very effective for 
marking him as an expert, coupled with Senior Scientist at the EPA, his testimony is beyond reproach. It 
is effective and persuasive, and one of the few political ads that was found that confronts Monsanto’s 
discourse of safety in such an accessible way.  
 Many of the advertisements for the Yes campaigns follow similar styles where an “expert” is on 
screen and he refutes the claims of the No campaigns. One video even features Michael Hanson of the 
Consumer Union, from Consumer Reports, discussing the costs associated with labeling GMOs in other 
countries—there were no costs associated with GMO labeling initiatives in the 64 countries who do 
require GMO ingredients to be declared. Michael Hanson, and by extension Consumer Reports, endorses 
the Yes on 92 ballot initiative. Consumer Reports, according to the ad, is supposed to provide unbiased 
information to consumers; their endorsement must then be because the initiative is unbiased. This ad 
finishes with Michael Hanson’s voiceover “vote Yes on 92, a clear well-written plan giving you the right to 
know what is in your food” (Oregon Right to Know, 2014b) and a mom with her several children eating 
around a table with a red gingham tablecloth. These visual cues tell the viewer that this is about families 
have a right to know what they’re feeding their children. This advertisement is also especially persuasive, 
an unbiased account of costs associated with GMO labeling and the right for moms to know what is in 
their children’s food. Michael Hanson represents yet another expert in the discourse of labeling initiatives.  
 Yes on 105 campaigns put together by Right to Know Colorado are very similar in style, but 
utilizes more tongue-in-cheek dialogue. In one advertisement, celebrity Danny DeVito is in the face of the 
viewer, literally as his face takes up most of the frame, and he is confrontationally saying “what makes 
you think you have the right to know,” celebrity trainer Gillian Michaels says incredulously “who do you 
think you are,” comedian Bill Mahar says condescendingly “you shouldn’t know your food is genetically 
modified,” actor John Cho says “you might do something dumb,” actor Glenn Howerton follows up with a 
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furrowed brow and grandiose hand gestures “like looking at labels and making decisions” (Right To Know 
Colorado-Label GMOs, 2014a). This account covers the first 12 seconds of the TV spot, but it continues 
with celebrities acting in a mock-paternal way (suggestive of the way Monsanto and other opponents of 
labeling discuss cognitive misers) for 31 seconds.  
Another ad features some of the same actors in lab coats with a company name on the pocket, 
for example Danny DeVito is in a coat with Monsanto monogramed on the pocket. The actors are 
outwardly mocking the faux-paternalism (Right To Know Colorado-Label GMOs, 2014b) that could be 
construed from Monsanto’s website (“Labeling Food and Ingredients Developed from GM Seed,” 2013). 
These Yes on 105 advertisements are fairly confrontational, but not with the viewer, they confront the way 
that opponents of labeling tend to speak of laymen’s potential interpretation of such labeling. It’s a familiar 
ironic trope that is seen in television frequently, the viewer should recognize the trope as ironic 
condescension of outside sources, in this case the way the opponents discuss labeling of GMOs as 
confusing. This stylistic choice may be a result of the fact that these actors are probably not experts on 
GMOs, but it may also serve to highlight that people who are not unbiased experts are pouring money 
into the opposing coalition. Glenn Howerton and Danny DeVito probably know as much about GMO 
labeling as the average consumer so it’s ironic that they would “play” experts in advertisements and 
perhaps this may disrupt some of the internalization of the opponents’ message. Both advertisements 
attack the assumptions of the No campaigns through parody, suggesting that the conclusions of the No 
campaigns are fatally flawed.  
 Right to Know Colorado and Right to Know Oregon appear to be connected in some ways, 
though perhaps not officially. Right to Know Colorado’s website features some of the same political 
advertisements as Right to Know Oregon with the appropriate “Yes on 105” (CO) inserted instead of “Yes 
on 92” (OR). They also cite many of the same facts regarding GMO labeling, namely that 64 countries 
including the UK and Japan require food labels to declare genetic engineering (“Faqs & Resources,” 
2014). In addition to 64 countries labeling GMOs, there have been no associated costs to consumers in 
those countries according to the Michael Hanson political ad. Scott Faber (2013) threw his opinion into 
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the game as well. In a Huffington Post blog, Scott Faber (2013), former Vice President of the Grocery 
Manufacturers Association (GMA) and current Vice President of Governmental Affairs of the 
Environmental Working Group, wrote about what drives food costs as he experienced it in the GMA. He 
suggests that changing a label has no real impact on the costs of food,  
manufacturers are constantly changing their labels to highlight product innovations or to make 
health claims. Although it varies from product to product, the average "refresh" cycle for a food 
label is about a year. Adding the words "may contain genetically engineered ingredients" will add 
as much to the cost of making food as adding the words "can help reduce cholesterol" -- nothing. 
(Faber, 2013) 
Similar assertions can be found on the Right to Know Colorado and Right to Know Oregon websites and 
in their advertisements, but this is a former GMA lobbyist asserting that GMO labels are not costly. Scott 
Faber (2013), while not particularly prominent in the discourse, echoes the opinions and assertions of the 
coalitions for labeling with added expertise.  
 Right to Know Colorado and Right to Know Oregon also both cite Consumer Reports, which 
speaks to the unbiased nature of the report and its applicability crosses state lines. In terms of similarity, 
however, it interesting that Oregon had a great deal of focus on families and children having a right to 
know what is in their food (“Why Label GMO Foods,” 2014), while it seemed Right to Know Colorado 
appeared to lean more toward individualized choice and transparency. For example, one political 
advertisement in Colorado showed a cartoon of a man shopping in the dark holding two ears of corn. The 
voice-over asks why Coloradans are shopping in the dark about genetically engineered labels, then goes 
on to state that some foods like corn are registered pesticides with the EPA, and the light clicks on 
audibly. While this is not wholly different from the unique ads in Oregon, there is little to no mention of 
children and families. This may explain the vast difference in votes between the two states, Colorado’s 
105 ballot initiative was opposed by 65.47% of voters (“Colorado Mandatory Labeling of GMOs Initiative, 
Proposition 105,” 2014)  while Oregon’s 92 ballot initiative was opposed by a much slimmer 50.03% 
(“Oregon Mandatory Labeling of GMOs Initiative, Measure 92,” 2014). Both measures were opposed and 
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defeated, ultimately. It’s unclear as to why, other than the outrageous outspending by those opposed to 
the initiatives as the Right to Know campaigns were robust and persuasive, but without funding, their 
reach and impact was limited. As stated earlier, No on 105 and No on 92 political advertisements were 
removed from YouTube and other media sites but the news articles and Twitter accounts painted them as 
flat but extremely persuasive.  
 Labeling activists assert that despite ballot losses, the fight is long from over as evidenced on 
their respective websites and editorials (Cooper & Cooper, 2014; Law, 2014; “Race to Require Labeling 
of Genetically Engineered Foods Remains Too Close to Call,” 2014; Runyan, 2014a, 2014b; Wozniacka, 
2014). It’s still considered a victory that the initiatives made it to each state’s ballots and there was a voter 
turnout; this means that people are becoming more aware of agricultural systems of production.  
Conclusion 
 When comparing how legislation comes to pass in the public forum (e.g., state ballot measures) 
and HR 933—the Monsanto Protection Act—and The Dark Act introduced to Congress by Mike Pompeo, 
the differences are staggering. When there is no public dominant discourse deployment to examine 
because public opinion is not part of the equation, Congressman Mike Pompeo and others like him are 
able to act independently of the people. Given a choice, 90% of people polled say they want GMOs 
labeled (Acosta, 2014), but the initiatives to do so continue to fail. In the absence of a national standard, 
people seem to be wary of what it will mean to have GMOs labeled which makes the debate between the 
dominant discourse and the supra counter discourse especially interesting.  
 Opponents of labeling created experts in Don Ament and Amber Gray, two people who are more 
like everyday people than scientists. They were able to successfully reroute the argument from public 
knowledge of GMOs to costs associated with that knowledge to the consumer, small business owner, and 
the farmer. Anti-Labeling activists were able to reproduce the dominant discourse of Monsanto’s products 
in that they are safe as there has been no demonstrated risk of harm in either the herbicide the plant is 
designed to withstand or the plant itself.  
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 Proponents of labeling found industry experts, Dr. Ray Siedler, former EPA senior scientist, and 
Michael Hanson of Consumer Reports. Their expertise is different from Ament and Gray as they did not 
have to cultivate their expertise on the issue. Siedler and Hanson represented real people who could 
attest to their respective expertise, this is no different from the reification of people like Árpád Pusztai, 
Gilles-Eric Séralini, and Percy Schmeiser in Chapter Three. What is different, however, is that there was 
little debate about the safety of GMOs from the proponents of labeling in that they did not argue harm—
rather that they simply wanted to know what they were eating. This is most likely a rhetorical device 
because there is no scientific consensus of harm by GMOs, so it would be difficult to argue that in a 
public forum. Still, the proponents lead a robust and persuasive campaign that galvanized a voter turned, 
and perhaps the only detriment is the lack of funds to widely distribute the campaign.  
 Monsanto continues to be linked to legislation that pertains to GMOs, but in state ballot 
measures, the company appears to be all but absent. Monsanto donated a great deal of money to defeat 
labeling in Oregon and Colorado in 2014, as did many other companies whose products rely on GMOs to 
keep costs down. This suggests that “money talks,” indeed. Coloradans and Oregonians, despite 
expressing concerns over GMOs, voted to defeat the initiatives that would require labels. In the absence 
of demonstrated risk, people were swayed by the supposed costs associated with labeling. However, the 
supra counter discourse mobilized a great deal of people to vote, and this is very telling about how the 
dominant and counter discourses interact and offers insight into how future campaigns could be 






Genetically Modified Organisms represent one of the most salient topics of public discussion in 
the last two decades. Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring (1962) may have been the catalyzing text to set the 
stage for the modern environmental movement. The public was concerned about DDT and other toxic 
substances in the environment and Roundup, by all scientific measure of the 1970s, was shown to be 
safe. Roundup was adopted with enthusiasm and became one of the most used herbicides in the world in 
the decades that followed. Chapter Two chronicled the legislation that marked the new age of risk 
aversion following the political galvanization by Silent Spring and some changes in scientific risk 
conceptualization that may have contributed to the eventuation of Monsanto’s biotechnology assemblage. 
Monsanto introduced its first Roundup Ready Seed to be used in conjunction with the herbicide in 1996 
and has introduced several Roundup Ready crops since.  
 Since 1996, GMOs and Roundup Ready crops have been the subject of a great deal of debate in 
the United States. While Monsanto is not the only company developing GMOs to be used in conjunction 
with its herbicides, it is the most visible and most villainized by the supra counter discourse. Monsanto’s 
website and public relation campaigns are the main methods of deployment for its discourse. One has to 
question who the website and public relations campaign are designed for.  Are they designed for the 
public at large, industry insiders such as farmers, or journalists? It appears the entirety of the websites 
and social media campaigns are designed to be accessible to the lay-person. The audience of the 
dominant discourse was not the focus of this thesis, but an investigation of the audience may give more 
insight into the genesis and eventuation of the dominant discourse.  
Monsanto has developed a narrative where it is going to save the world through its biotechnology 
assemblage by 2050, Monsanto is the hero in its narrative as evidenced by its various public relations 
campaigns (e.g., America’s Farmers) and social media campaigns (e.g., YouTube and Facebook). The 
world is hungry and Monsanto is going to feed it. Monsanto positioned its products in the narrative as the 
keys to the future of agriculture. What is more interesting is the cultivation of science as almost religious 
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in Monsanto’s discourse as illustrated by their seminal texts that Monsanto refers to repetitiously to 
articulate safety in regards to Roundup and to dispute research that stands in contrast as “bad science.” 
The researchers and scientists responsible for this articulation are exalted, ethos is built up and 
reproduced to solidify the worldview through their science. For example, Robb Fraley, one of the 
scientists responsible for the development of Roundup Ready crops, is featured in a variety of 
Monsanto’s PR spots on its YouTube account. Another example is William, Kroes, and Munro’s (2000) 
work; it is repeatedly referred to in both the safety discourse and in response to contradictory research.  
The timing of Monsanto’s public participation was extremely important to the deployment of the 
dominant discourse, Chapter Two noted that while Monsanto was effectively silent during the months 
leading up to the 2014 Colorado and Oregon ballot initiatives that would have required labeling of 
genetically modified ingredients, there were many journalists reproducing the dominant worldview and 
acting as a mouthpiece for recent scientific publications that favored GMOs. Monsanto’s silence about 
mandatory labeling is similar to the reconstruction of the anti-labeling coalition’s discourse deployments in 
both Colorado and Oregon as chronicled in Chapter Four; Monsanto was a silent provider of funding that 
allowed for the wide proliferation of the dominant discourse. The day following the elections, Monsanto 
launched a site that allows for more direct exchange between its critics and the company (i.e., 
discover.monsanto.com). The silence of the company during political showdowns between the pro- and 
anti-labeling crowds is likely deliberate as Monsanto has been referred to as a villain years by popular 
press writings and agricultural documentaries. The interesting thing is the timing of Monsanto rebranding 
itself as transparent following an election where the anti-labeling campaigns were removed from the 
internet. Monsanto’s silence prior to the elections appears to be an implicit acknowledgment of its critics. 
The critics of Monsanto frequently reject the narrative of the company, Monsanto argues that it is 
a different company from the one founded in 1901 by John Queeny, only sharing the name. While this 
rhetorical positioning may be persuasive for the lay-person which Monsanto’s website is designed for, it 
does little to assuage the criticisms of the company. Authors of the supra counter discourse fight it fiercely 
by keeping a detailed record of Monsanto’s history. With every platform available, Monsanto’s critics 
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remind people of the products that made Monsanto successful—PCBs, DDT, and Agent Orange—all 
products that were modern marvels in their time and eventually shown to be devastating to both human 
and environmental health. Monsanto articulated the safety of its previous products much in the same way 
as GMOs, through science and necessity. The authors of the supra counter discourse charge that 
Monsanto was perfectly aware of the harm their products were producing and continued to champion 
their use by asserting their safety. The evidence the supra counter discourse offers of Monsanto’s 
knowledge is convincing, so much so that it convinced a jury to award the citizens of Anniston, Alabama a 
$700 million dollar judgment in 2006. The authors of the supra counter discourse are explicitly asking 
people if they can and should trust Monsanto about Roundup and Roundup Ready crops assemblages if 
one could not trust the assertions of safety regarding Monsanto’s PCBs and Agent Orange. The 
deployment of the supra counter discourse has gained ground in recent years as evidenced by the 
proliferation of popular media sites pitted against Monsanto, frequency of news stories concerning 
Roundup, and the volume of books, and documentaries coming out every year contesting Monsanto’s 
history. The retelling of Monsanto’s history may explain Monsanto’s own tactical silence and subsequent 
public rebranding. If Monsanto is indeed responding to the supra counter discourse in the designing of 
recent public relations and social media campaigns, this speaks to the perceived relevance of its 
criticisms. 
Chapter Three also outlined how the supra counter discourse develops its own articulation of 
safety and necessity. The supra counter discourse rejects Monsanto’s articulation of safety through 
federal regulation by questioning the integrity of the EPA, FDA, and USDA. The Toxic Substance Control 
Act of 1976 was supposed to set an expectation that EPA approved substances are safe and with the 
implementation of the legislation came criticisms that perhaps the EPA was underpowered in how it can 
regulate and govern. Later criticisms suggested that the EPA only requires a summary of potential harm 
and safety from the company registering a substance, Monsanto’s critics suggest the federal agencies 
are underpowered and the agencies have been co-opted by Monsanto (and other industry giants). 
Monsanto’s critics suggest that regulatory capture is evidence of such co-opting, this is performed by the 
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installing of regulatory agency decision makers that will favor Monsanto. The supra counter discourse 
discredits the claim that the Roundup Ready system is safe by discrediting the federal regulatory bodies 
that have declared it safe. Much like the evidence suggesting one cannot trust Monsanto; the evidence 
against the current regulation of Roundup and Roundup Ready crops is very persuasive.  
The supra counter discourse articulates a voice of authority through the research of independent 
scientists. The research reviewed in popular media sites such as Marie-Monique Robin’s (2010) The 
World According to Monsanto and the documentary Seeds of Death (2012) stand in stark contrast to 
Monsanto’s science. Chapter Three reviewed studies that suggested exposure to Roundup is linked to 
several kinds of lymphoma cancers in men as well as studies that suggested severe health 
consequences in laboratory animals. The dominant discourse and supra counter discourse both articulate 
safety similarly, but the supra counter discourse also absorbs Monsanto’s criticisms of scientist who 
suggest either Roundup or Roundup Ready crops are dangerous. Both Árpád Pusztai and Gilles-Eric 
Séralini experienced professional repercussions that followed the reveal of their studies that suggest 
GMOs are dangerous. The supra counter discourse uses the experiences of scientists who have spoken 
out or published on GMOs as evidence that Monsanto is silencing dissent and this is all the more reason 
to not trust their deployments. Effectively, Séralini and Pusztai become folk heroes in the supra counter 
discourse narrative of Monsanto. Much like Séralini and Pusztai, other people touched personally by the 
far-reaching power of Monsanto, such as Canadian farmer Percy Schmeiser, become heroes. 
In addition to redressing people as heroes, the supra counter discourse also reminds its audience 
that Monsanto feeding the world may be a noble goal, there is already more than enough food for the 
world’s population. Perhaps Monsanto focuses so heavily on feeding more and more people in its 
campaigns because it is cultivating its public image as benevolent. This may be a response to the 
barrage of demonizing rhetoric directed at the company. Critics flatly refuse Monsanto’s premise that the 
world needs more food; instead they suggest there are enough calories being produced to feed the world 
twice over. Moreover, the authors of the supra counter discourse suggest a lack of access to food is 
symptomatic of a social-economic issue. 
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 The voices of the dominant discourse and the supra counter discourse seem to interact rarely, 
but in the last few elections, there has been a fight over public opinion of GMOs. Chapter Four recounted 
the pro- and anti-labeling coalitions in the 2014 state elections of Colorado and Oregon. The advertising 
of each campaign provides insights into the discourses interactions. The anti-labeling discourse, while 
difficult to reconstruct as it had been largely removed from the internet, focused on GMOs being 
necessary to provided inexpensive food and labeling GMOs would put financial burdens on farmers. This 
is a logical extension of Monsanto’s assertion that GMOs are necessary to feed the world and maintaining 
Monsanto’s self-constructed heroic and savior like image. The anti-labeling coalitions also redressed 
mandatory GMO labeling as a non-issue by reminding people that GMOs have been part of the food 
system for nearly twenty years and labeling at this point would just raise food costs.  
 The pro-labeling coalitions built a campaign out of transparency, which is a slight divergence from 
how the supra counter discourse campaigns. The major players promoting the supra counter discourse 
tend to be referenced by Monsanto as alarmist and anti-science. Anticipating this type of attack, the pro-
labeling faction avoided the question of scientific “fact” by instead focusing on transparency, arguing that 
genetically engineered ingredients be labeled so that people can make fully informed choices. The 
decision to avoid debating facts was likely a deliberate rhetorical choice to avoid connections being drawn 
to scientists who have been deemed unscientific by their peers as a result of suspected industry 
pressure. Instead the pro-labeling focused on refuting the anti-labeling claims, a strategy that is in line 
with the supra counter discourse,  
 Although the Colorado and Oregon attempts to mandate labeling ultimately failed to affect change 
in labeling genetically engineered ingredients, they did raise awareness nationally and locally in each of 
those states. Many people suggest the state ballot measures were still a success because of this 
awareness raising effect. For example, the Law Library of Congress notes that 90% of people when 
polled want to know if they’re eating GMO ingredients (Acosta, 2014). This finding, in conjunction with the 
turnout numbers in Colorado and Oregon elections, reveal something startling. Genetically modified crops 
are flourishing in the US while most people are unaware they are consuming them. In the 64 countries 
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that require labeling of GMOs, there is very little use for the crops. The voter turnout suggests the general 
acceptance of GMOs in the US is not an American characteristic but rather it is may be symptomatic of 
ignorance about, and alienation from, the agricultural food system, which is a much larger problem in and 
of itself. 
 Genetically modified organisms are a salient and interesting flashpoint in the modern discussion 
of agriculture, but perhaps it is just the beginning of the conversation needed surrounding big agriculture. 
People in the US appear alienated from their food. Many do not consider the source of food beyond that 
of the grocery store. GMOs may be serving to distract consumers from other issues of big agriculture, for 
example, why are so few people questioning the agricultural system that requires a plant that can 
withstand heavy doses of herbicide? What niche did GMOs fill when they were first introduced? GMOs 
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